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ABSTRACT

CREDIT CONSTRAINED? HOW THE COST OF CAPITAL AFFECTS DISTRICT
RESOURCES AND STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT

J. Cameron Anglum
Matthew P. Steinberg

From the mid-1990s to the mid-2010s, school districts across the United States spent over
$1.25 trillion on capital outlays to invest in the physical infrastructures of their schools.
To finance these expenditures, districts today carry over $400 billion in long-term debt
and pay over $17 billion in interest payments annually, figures which have doubled over
the past two decades. Despite the immense magnitude of these debt-driven investments,
scant research has examined the subject of school district debt and differences which may
exist in debt utilization among districts of varying characteristics and across varied state
policy contexts. In this paper, I first explore trends in district debt practices over the past
two decades on a national basis and decomposed by several different school district
characteristics. I then leverage an exogenous shock to the costs of district borrowing, a
2010 municipal credit rating recalibration event, to estimate the effect of cheaper access
to debt financing on district debt issuance. I find that in contexts where state governments
do not financially support district school facilities expenditures, districts are particularly
sensitive to their cost of debt, and issue more debt when it becomes cheaper to do so,
particularly districts serving large shares of disadvantaged students. On the other hand, I
v

also present evidence which suggests that additional debt issuance may be crowded out
by existing capital expenditures and spent instead on instructional expenditures. As
national dialogue regarding infrastructure investments and constrained school district
budgets gain increased attention, these findings may inform governmental policies
regarding state investments in local school district capital expenditures, particularly in
districts serving large shares of disadvantaged students.
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Introduction
WHY STUDY SCHOOL DISTRICT DEBT?

In recent years, school finance research has extensively augmented the body of
empirical evidence concerning the effects of school finance reforms on underserved
student populations. As a result, there is a substantial body of evidence documenting the
impact of state and federal finance reforms on the provision of school resources and on
student outcomes. Much of this research reveals the important role of resources for the
outcomes of students in economically disadvantaged districts. At the same time, much
remains empirically unknown and untested in the subject of public school funding. One
of those underexplored areas in education finance is the subject of school district capital
constraints in their access to resources and, in particular, how the cost of debt may
influence a district’s decision to issue debt and subsequently spend it on school resources.
Amid this paucity of research, the education and public policy literatures largely remain
silent on the determinants of district debt issuance and connections between school
district debt, district resource provision and allocation, and student outcomes. In this
context, this dissertation seeks to shed light on critical aspects school district debt and the
role it serves in the funding of public education.
In Chapter One I review the literature related to school district debt issuance and
capital expenditure. I motivate the study of school district debt as a component of school
district revenues used to fund district capital investments. Reporting in recent decades
indicates there is a growing need for improved school infrastructure. More recent
evidence analyzes the extent to which such investments may influence district and
1

student outcomes. I also review elements of how a school district issues debt and the
importance of credit ratings in the issuance process.
In Chapter Two I explore trends in district debt utilization. Notable upward trends
in per-pupil district debt holdings have emerged over the past two decades, trends which
are shared across many different district categorizations. Differences in levels of debt
utilization persist, however, across district types. These differences may inform policy
conversations as states consider whether to support local district debt costs and capital
expenditures.
In Chapter Three I examine a natural experiment, a 2010 Moody’s Investor
Services ‘recalibration’ of its municipal credit ratings, to estimate the effect of a
reduction in the cost of debt on district debt issuance. While there exist several levers
which may influence a district’s decision to utilize debt, the cost of debt may present a
primary driver of district decision making. Districts may be more likely to issue debt
when it is cheaper. The examination of this natural experiment empirically tests whether
district cost of debt constrains district debt issuance by examining a loosening of those
constraints for a subset of districts. I also explore the effects of two prevalent state-level
policies related to district capital expenditure, state funding programs in support of local
capital expenditures and state credit enhancement programs, on district sensitivity to
costs of debt. Finally, I extend the analysis of the Moody’s recalibration natural
experiment to examine the effect of debt funded expenditures on district resource
allocations and on student achievement. This analysis empirically analyzes the budgetary
and achievement effects of cost-driven debt constraints, testing the elasticities of district
expenditures.
2

In Chapter Four I consider the empirical findings of the preceding chapters in
light of the existing literature. Research over the past two decades has focused primarily
on district capital need and on the effects of certain infrastructure investments. By
comparison, little work has focused on the funding mechanisms through which districts
may allocate resources to capital projects and, by extension, the effects of such
mechanisms on district and student outcomes. I conclude with policy considerations
derived from my empirical findings.
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Chapter 1
SCHOOL DISTIRCT DEBT FINANCING AND CAPITAL EXPENDITURE:
MOTIVATIONS AND EFFICACY

School District Revenues
Over the past half-century, per-pupil expenditures in public education nearly
tripled in real terms (U.S. Department of Education, 2005). In recent decades, to generate
this increase in average per-pupil expenditures school districts have relied upon a range
of policy mechanisms including several new state and federal revenue initiatives. For
example, many state-level finance reforms, achieved through court-ordered funding
formulae revisions, legislative reforms, or a combination of the two restructured state
roles in local district funding (see Shores, Candelaria, & Kabourek, 2019). Such revisions
typically direct a greater share of state education funds to districts which serve larger
shares of disadvantaged students. These reforms often have been found to generate
improved student outcomes (i.e. Jackson, Johnson, & Persico, 2016; Lafortune,
Rothstein, & Schanzenbach, 2016; Card & Payne, 2002; Hoxby, 2001; etc.). Although
irregular in their respective timing and duration, new federal programs, including fiscal
stimulus and competitive grant programs, have increased federal revenue provision in
support of local educational expenditures particularly during times of economic downturn
(i.e. Evans, Schwab, & Wagner, 2017; Chakrabarti, Livingston, & Roy, 2014).
The aforementioned state and federal finance reforms augmented local education
spending during an era characterized by two central public policy considerations: 1)
measures of equity and adequacy in the distribution of public resources; and 2) on the
academic and longitudinal outcomes of disadvantaged students (i.e. Duncombe & Yinger,
4

1998). Governance over revenue provision from state and federal revenue sources,
however, lies beyond the direct control of local voters and their respective government
officials who hold power over local taxation policies. Therefore, in many scenarios
school districts with taxing authorities and local municipal governments tasked with
funding their local districts must rely on local revenue sources to guarantee increased or
sustained funding levels.
District revenues are comprised of four inputs, revenues derived from the
aforementioned federal and state sources, and those received from local and private
sources. In other words, revenue in district i is comprised of receipts from federal, state,
local, and private sources such that Revenuei = f (RevFederali , RevStatei , RevLocali ,
RevPrivatei). State and local revenues constitute the vast majority, or approximately 90%,
of local district revenues, on average (Snyder, de Brey, & Dillow, 2016). Local governing
bodies, however, only directly control local revenues, those made up of local tax receipts
and borrowed funds, the latter of which typically are acquired through municipal bond
issuance, such that RevLocali = f (LocalTaxReceiptsi , FundsBorrowedi). Policies related
to the first component, local tax receipts, have been studied extensively across varied
state and local contexts. Many studies have explored district response to changes in the
formulas or programs which distribute non-locally derived funding, state funding
formulas, for example. Conversely, little research has examined how districts pursue
debt-funded revenue strategies, how such strategies may vary by district characteristics,
and how changes to district borrowing capacities may affect district borrowing decisions
and subsequent resource allocations.

5

Research on tax policies related to the funding of public education has examined
both locally driven tax legislation and local tax response to state and federal revenue
policies. One line of research has examined the effects of restrictive tax laws on district
resources and student achievement (i.e. Figlio, 1997; Downes & Shah, 2006). Property
tax limitations, these studies conclude, may harm student achievement by constricting
local education spending, particularly in low-income districts. The level at which a
taxation ceiling is legislated relative to preexisting tax rates, however, may attenuate the
effects of such policies in circumstances where local school budgets may not require
significant reductions (Downes, Dye, & McGuire, 1998). Furthermore, the effects of
locally determined tax limitations on district spending may be difficult to generalize due
to their endogenous origins in the prevailing tax preferences of local voters (Dye,
McGuire, & McMillen, 2005).
Several studies have examined local tax response to exogenous increases in state
aid, primarily policies aimed to improve the equitable distribution of state resources to
districts which serve large shares of disadvantaged students (i.e. Card & Payne, 2002;
Steinberg, Quinn, Kreisman, & Anglum, 2016). Such studies empirically estimate the
degree to which a “flypaper effect” or a “crowding-out effect” materializes in local
districts (Hines & Thaler, 1995). The theory which motivates the flypaper effect contends
that money “sticks” where it is designated. For example, an increase in state monetary
allocations to local school districts would result in increased local educational
expenditures; revenues designated by the state for local educational expenditures “stick”
to that purpose. The crowding-out effect, on the other hand, occurs when local
expenditure levels are maintained after grant receipts rather than increased. Instead, such
6

grants may fund commensurate reductions in local taxes, thus reducing local
contributions to the budget item, or spur the reallocation of local revenues to fund other
purposes; revenues designated by the state for local expenditures crowd out local
expenditures previously designated to fund the same purpose.
Despite long-running increases in educational expenditures, state funding sources
have not uniformly increased their contributions to local education spending. For
example, over the past decade school districts have witnessed increased pressure to
maintain total funding levels in the wake of the Great Recession, primarily due to notable
declines in state budget allocations to public K-12 education. In fact, average state
funding declined $850 per pupil from 2008 to 2013 and 31 states had not restored prerecession funding levels by 2015 (Leachman, Masterson, & Figueroa, 2017). These
declines in state support sharpened the burden on local municipalities to bridge funding
gaps through local revenue provision. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Great
Recession, funding gaps between well-resourced and poor school districts grew, effects
witnessed most evidently for districts with the highest state aid allotments (Evans,
Schwab, & Wagner, 2017). State revenues for public education also declined in other
recessionary environments, including the aftermath of the 2001 recession. To compensate
for lost state revenues, local districts responded by increasing local property tax revenue
(Dye & Reschovsky, 2008). Districts in New York responded in a similar manner after
the Great Recession, (Chakrabarti, Livingston & Roy, 2014). Each of these analyses
focus on local tax response to state and federal policies, many enacted as responses to
specific economic circumstances or to address fiscal challenges due to the enactment of
particular funding policies.
7

School District Debt
School district debt financing serves another key role in local revenue provision.
Districts typically seek access to debt markets, most commonly through municipal bond
issuance, to support long-term expenditures including facilities construction; districts
may also issue short-term debt typically to support financing of day-to-day operations
(Ammar, Duncombe, Jump, & Wright, 2004). The following section reviews the existing
literature regarding school district debt issuance including its public policy motivations
and evidence of the effects of debt-funded expenditures on students and other
constituencies. While much of this research may help inform policymakers and
administrators engaged in district revenue raising, further research is needed to help
explain disparities in debt issuance among different district types and the effects such
disparities may have on district and student outcomes.

School Facilities Quality
Demand for public school facilities investment has longstanding roots in public
policy discussions. Amid a growing national focus on entrenched socioeconomic and
educational disadvantage among minority groups driven by the civil rights movement in
the 1950s and 1960s, The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Coleman Report in 1966
sharpened public focus on public school resources. Quality of school facilities and
resource provision across students of varying disadvantage and race became emblematic
of chronic inequities in the provision of public education, differences hypothesized to
contribute to differences in academic achievement. The national focus placed on public
school quality continued in the 1980s through the publication of A Nation at Risk in 1983
8

and the 1989 Education Summit in Charlottesville, Virginia during Ronald Reagan’s and
George H. W. Bush’s presidencies, respectively. Continuing federal deliberation over
public education, both debates raised significant concerns over trends in American
academic achievement and economic competitiveness while continuing to underscore
longitudinal disparities in achievement among different groups of students.
Despite these national calls to action, resource disparities across student
populations persisted, including severe deficiencies in public school facilities. In 1996,
the United States General Accounting Office (U.S. GAO) published a report for Congress
detailing the status of American public school facilities, a report which shed light on
widespread and significant inadequacies. The report estimated that America’s public
schools required $112 billion (approximately $175 billion in 2017 dollars) in school
infrastructure improvements. Necessary improvements cited in the report spanned a
broad range of concerns associated with, “Deferred maintenance, health and safety, and
accessibility” (Arsen & Davis, 2006). In the years since the GAO report, capital outlays
on public school facilities increased and today range between $50 and $90 billion
annually (2017 dollars), or approximately 7 to 11%of total public elementary and
secondary school budgets nationwide (Snyder et al., 2016). Nonetheless, reports in many
districts suggest greater investment is warranted, particularly in low-income districts. The
School District of Philadelphia, for example, recently cited a $5 billion facilities need to
correct for issues associated with health and safety, code compliance, operations and
general maintenance, and capital improvement (Parsons, 2017). Many other urban and
low-income districts may require similar types of investments. Such reports suggest that
the GAO report two decades ago may have offered a decidedly conservative estimate of
9

school capital requirements. Isolated reports of district capital need may be common, yet
little research has systematically reviewed differences in such need among different
district types and differences in how districts raise revenues to fund such capital
expenditures.
Districts may pursue substantive capital projects to address several contemporary
demographic and infrastructure-related demands. Harris and Munley (2002) cite several
prevalent rationales. First, as the school-aged population in the so-called ‘baby boomer
generation’ expanded in the 1950s and 1960s, many school districts built new school
facilities, buildings which may require substantial investment by the 2000s and 2010s,
particularly in the suburban districts which expanded rapidly in prior decades. Second,
many districts have witnessed overcrowding due to changing migration patterns. Urban
school districts in Sunbelt states, for example, have experienced strong enrollment
growth largely comprised in large part of significant influxes of students of color
(Frankenberg, 2009). Third, district facilities may require investment to accommodate
modern technology infrastructure including adequate internet capabilities. Finally, school
districts must comply with new government accessibility mandates such as those required
by the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, both of which witnessed substantive revisions in the 1990s and 2000s to create more
equitable learning environments for the disabled.
In 1999, the U.S. Department of Education commissioned a report on public
school facilities quality (Lewis et al., 2000). The report identified 14% of public schools
as overcrowded, schools with between 6% and 25% more students than their capacities,
and 8% as severely overcrowded, schools with over 25%more students than their
10

capacities. Overcrowded and severely overcrowded schools both were more likely to
serve larger shares of minority students (Ready, Lee, & Welner, 2004). Long-term
planning to alleviate such conditions, however, has proved challenging in many
jurisdictions. The growth of school choice, the expansion of the public provision of early
childhood education, and the movement in support of smaller schools, among other
prevalent education policy initiatives, represent many competing demands on school
facilities infrastructure, initiatives which may generate uncertainty in school facilities
planning for local neighborhood schools (Stevenson, 2006).
School facilities construction has also been cited as a key element of
contemporary debates concerning equitable and adequate school funding. For example,
Arsen and Davis (2006) analyzed school facilities and unmet capital need in Michigan, a
state with a wide distribution of school capital expenditure and, in turn, a wide
distribution of school facilities quality across districts with varying levels of local
property wealth. The authors estimated that school capital assets in Michigan varied from
$4,300 to $87,000 per pupil, while schools in districts with unmet capital need required
an average investment of $7,000 per pupil, or an additional 30% investment on the
valuation of existing capital. Such shortfalls were found to be most prevalent in
Michigan’s 15 central city school districts and in low-income suburban districts, districts
with roughly half the school capital stock of the state average. These disparities highlight
differences in facilities quality across student populations, differences the authors argue
motivate significant equity and adequacy debates. The Michigan example recalls
longstanding resource deficiencies, elements prevalent in the 1996 U.S. GAO report and
prior government accounting.
11

Efficacy of Investments in School Facilities
Despite frequent calls for investment in public school facilities in past decades,
there existed scant rigorous evidence on the direct effects of such investments. To address
this shortcoming, a number of recent studies have contributed to an emerging body of
evidence regarding the effects of capital investment in school facilities on a host of
important outcomes including student achievement, teacher attrition, and property values,
outcomes relevant to a range of interested parties and research disciplines. An increased
focus on America’s deteriorating public infrastructure, including its stock of public
school facilities, may continue this trend in years to come.

1. Student Achievement
In one of the first studies to directly examine the association between school
facilities quality and student achievement, Berner (1993) studied school facilities
conditions in Washington, D.C. Categorizing school facilities condition as poor, average,
or excellent, Berner found an improvement in school quality of one level (i.e. poor to
average) to be associated with a 5.5 percentage point increase in student achievement
after controlling for several important covariates including student race, enrollment,
school age, and local average income. Further, Berner cautioned that despite such
associations, school facilities maintenance budgets often are primary targets of budget
cuts. On the other hand, Berner warned that unobserved variables beyond the covariates
in her model, variables including parental motivation and residential selection, may bias
her findings.

12

Despite Berner’s findings, correlational studies may remain unlikely to
convincingly demonstrate the direct relationship between capital investment and student
achievement. Several recent studies, however, have employed a variety of more rigorous
econometric techniques to investigate the relationship between capital investments and
student outcomes. Typically leveraging a range of natural experiments, these studies have
employed rigorous research designs to directly support causal claims relating to school
facilities investments and student achievement.
Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) examined two decades of school bond
referenda in California to estimate the effects of investments in the physical infrastructure
of public schools on student achievement, housing prices, and household sorting. The
California contexts offers a rich research setting as 629 of its 1,035 districts conducted at
least one bond referendum between 1987 and 2006. Pioneering a dynamic regression
discontinuity design to investigate third grade student achievement, the authors found a
0.077 standard deviation increase in math achievement and a 0.067 standard deviation
increase in reading achievement in response to bond passage. Importantly, the modest
measured effects emerged six years after bond passage and dissipated in the decade
thereafter.
Nielson and Zimmerman (2011) studied New Haven, Connecticut, a poor urban
school district comprised of 22,000 students, 80% of whom qualify for free lunch and
90% of whom are racial minorities. New Haven pursued an aggressive plan of facilities
improvement wherein 49 schools were improved substantially or newly built. The authors
leveraged the staggered execution of construction from the mid-1990s to 2010 to evaluate
several outcomes associated with school construction including elementary and middle
13

school student achievement, home prices, and student enrollment. Regarding academic
achievement, the authors found an average 0.21 standard deviation improvement in
reading achievement six years after students moved to a new or improved school
building, or a 0.027 standard deviation increase per $10,000 invested. Estimated effects
in math were of a similar magnitude but with variation too great to claim statistical
significance.
Hong and Zimmer (2016) studied bond elections in Michigan from 1996 to 2009
to evaluate the impact of school capital infrastructure investments on student
achievement. The authors employed the dynamic regression discontinuity design initially
employed by Cellini et al. (2010). They found improved reading proficiency rates in
fourth graders of 2 to 5% beginning five years after bond passage and three to six percent
in seventh graders beginning seven years after bond passage; these results constitute
approximately 0.1 to 0.3 standard deviations of reading achievement proficiency rates.
The authors caution that while there is evidence that such investments generate notable
improvements in student achievement, speculation regarding the results of long-term
cost-benefit analysis measuring the societal impact of the investments remains unclear.
Also notable in their results is the significant delay witnessed in improved achievement,
echoing the timing of the findings of Cellini et al.
Martorell, Stange, and McFarlin (2016), on the other hand, found limited, if any
evidence that school construction projects improve student achievement. Studying bond
elections in Texas from 1994 to 2011 covering 2,277 different local bond referenda, the
authors found no evidence of gains in student achievement even six years after bond
passage. The authors did detect small improvements in student achievement among
14

disdadvantaged students, those students eligible to receive free lunch, though they
caution that those estimates are sensitive to different model specifications. In addition,
only modest improvements in student attendance were detected.
Conlin and Thompson (2017) studied a large-scale school construction program in
Ohio from 1997 to 2011. The state invested over ten billion dollars in school
improvement projects across 231 school districts, over one-third of Ohio’s districts. The
authors exploit variation in district eligibility to participate in Ohio’s Classroom Facilities
Assistance Program (CFAP) and in investment timing to estimate effects of school
construction projects on student achievement and housing prices using an instrumental
variables approach. The authors estimated a 0.15 percentage point decline in student math
achievement proficiency rates per $1,000 per-pupil investment in the two years prior to
facilities completion potentially reflecting the disruptive short-term effects of
construction. Four years after facilities completion, once investments had been completed
and capitalized in improved value of capital stock, however, the authors found a 0.1
percentage point increase in math proficiency rates. Trends in reading proficiency were
of similar timing though of generally smaller magnitude.
Lafortune and Schonholzer (2018) examined a large-scale capital improvement
program in the Los Angeles Unified School District where more than 150 schools were
built and hundreds more were renovated from 2002 to 2017. Similar to prior results found
by Conlin and Thompson, the authors found a decline in mathematics achievement in
students’ first year in a new school facility, 0.04 standard deviations in this instance. Any
achievement losses, however, were overcome within four years, after which time student
math achievement improved by 0.1 standard deviations, on average. Student reading
15

achievement improved as well after four years in a new school facility, by 0.05 standard
deviations.

2. Teachers
In the literature pertaining to teacher labor markets, teacher turnover often is cited
as the most important factor pertaining to school staffing, more important than the
recruitment of new teachers or the retirement of experienced teachers (i.e. Ingersoll,
2001). The literature offers evidence pertaining to a wide range of factors associated with
teacher attrition including teacher wages, accountability practices, societal standing and
perceived status, and school working conditions, including facility quality. For example,
teachers working in urban districts often cite poor working conditions including
dilapidated and overcrowded facilities as primary rationales for leaving a teaching
position. In fact, such working conditions often are more important predictors of teacher
attrition than student demographic characteristics (Darling-Hammond, 2003). To
investigate this crucial aspect of teacher labor markets, several studies have examined
how school facilities quality may impact important teacher staffing issues including
retention, turnover, and job satisfaction.
Buckley, Schneider, and Shang (2005) surveyed teachers in Washington, D.C.
schools to gauge the factors which contribute to teacher decisions to leave a teaching
position. In addition to teacher age, satisfaction with pay, and perceptions of community
supports, facilities quality, including atmospheric elements such as temperature, lighting,
acoustics, emerged as a significant predictor of teacher retention. Johnson, Kraft, and
Papay (2012) surveyed teachers in Massachusetts on a range of elements that make up
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school working conditions. They found facilities quality to be a key predictor of teacher
job satisfaction and retention decisions, approximately half as large as estimated effect
sizes related to school social characteristics including principal leadership and school
culture. Simon and Johnson (2015) corroborate Johnson et al.’s findings regarding
teacher working conditions. Analyzing six prior studies on teacher turnover, including
Johnson et al., the authors support conclusions indicating the importance of school
facilities to teacher retention, though again less important an indicator than social
working conditions including school leadership. In sum, alongside oft-cited school
attributes including principal leadership and school culture, school facilities quality
remain an important element of teacher working conditions and a significant predictor of
teacher turnover.

3. Property Values
Several of the aforementioned studies extended their analyses to examine
important public policy outcome measures beyond student achievement. Parental
preferences for schools often are studied through effects witnessed on local housing
prices in the aftermath of new policies or specific financial investments (i.e. Bayer,
Ferreira, & McMillan, 2007). In addition, neighborhood-level effects of school
improvement programs often are examined due to the role of schools as anchor
institutions crucial to local social interactions (i.e. Taylor, McGlynn, & Luter, 2013).
While each of the following studies approaches the measurement of housing prices
utilizing a slightly different methodology, they each address the capitalization of
investments in neighborhood public schools through local housing prices.
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In California, Cellini et al. (2010), found between a $1.39 and $1.79 increase in
local housing prices for each dollar of school district bond issuance. Nielson and
Zimmerman (2011) found a 1.27% increase in housing prices per $10,000 per capita
school construction expenses, an amount which translated to 10% total effect per the
average school investment in New Haven, Connecticut. Similar to their findings
pertaining to student achievement, Conlin and Thompson (2017) found home prices to
decline in the two years following capital school investment, then increase by $0.80 for
every dollar of improvement in the value of school capital stock in the following years.
The facilities investments studied by the authors in Ohio suggest that a $10,000 increase
in capital investment is associated with a 1.2% increase in local housing prices. Lafortune
and Schonholzer (2018) found housing prices in Los Angeles to increase by six percent in
neighborhoods with a new school and determined a “willingness-to-pay” of 1.2 to 1.6 for
every dollar of capital investment, an estimate consistent with prior findings by Cellini et
al. and Nielson and Zimmerman. In varied geographies across the country, each of these
recent studies help to inform policies that increase investments in school infrastructure by
demonstrating their effects on local housing prices.

4. Additional Outcomes
Student Health. Health considerations related to indoor air quality and other
harmful exposures in school facilities are particularly salient for children as they spend a
large portion of their time in school buildings during formative years of physical
maturation. Despite such considerations, there exist scant environmental regulations
regarding air quality in schools. Mendell and Heath (2005) reviewed the literature
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specifically pertaining to the relationship between school indoor air quality and student
achievement. In their review, the authors found suggestive evidence that a range of poor
indoor environmental qualities (IEQs) including nitrogen dioxide exposure, poor outdoor
air ventilation, and exposure to a range of biological and chemical pollutants contributed
to decreased student attendance and lower academic achievement. Many of these
pollutants have been linked to a host of ailments including asthma, respiratory infections,
and allergic reactions. Mendell and Heath warn, however, that strong causal links of such
factors in schools are not prevalent in the literature.
A number of studies examine the effects of early childhood lead exposure on
subsequent achievement results (i.e. Bellinger et al., 1992; Evens et al., 2015; Zhang, et
al., 2013). Each of these studies finds a negative relationship between early childhood
lead exposure and later achievement. The majority of such studies, however, focus on
early childhood exposure rather than exposure in public school facilities. In school
contexts, a Philadelphia study found 57.4% of its public school buildings exceeded
acceptable lead levels in drinking water as directed by the Environmental Protection
Agencies (EPA) (Bryant, 2004). A New Orleans study concluded that inner-city schools
demonstrated significantly higher lead levels in soil than mid-city and outer-city schools
(Higgs, Mielke, & Brisco, 1999). Such exposures both within and beyond school
environments require special medical treatment and ongoing academic attention, costs
that far outstrip exposure prevention efforts (Zahan et al., 2009).

School Climate. Uline and Tschannen-Moran (2008) and Durán-Narucki (2008)
investigated variables posited to mediate the relationship between school facilities quality
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and student achievement. Examining 80 middle schools in Virginia, Uline and
Tschannen-Moran administered surveys to over a thousand teachers to gain insights into
the role of school climate. The authors concluded that that inadequate facilities were
associated with weakened focus on strong academics, reduced community engagement to
support student learning, and diminished teacher enthusiasm to support student learning,
qualities that contributed to poorer school climate, a mediating variable for student
achievement. Bowers and Urick (2011) drew similar conclusions regarding teacher
perceptions of facilities quality. Utilizing a nationally representative sample, the authors
studied the relationship between facilities quality and eleventh and twelfth grade math
achievement. While they concluded that high school math achievement does not vary
significantly by facilities quality, the authors posited a mediated effects hypothesis
whereby teacher perceptions of facilities quality mediates its relationship with student
achievement.

Attendance and Enrollment. Durán-Narucki (2008) studied 95 elementary schools
in New York City, each of which was administered a building condition survey by an
independent architect or engineer. The author concluded that student attendance mediated
the relationship between building quality and student achievement while concluding that
students in poorer facilities attended school less often and displayed poorer performance
on standardized mathematics and English language arts assessments. Several additional
studies including those by Branham (2004) and Maxwell (2016) found school climate and
student attendance to mediate relationships between poor school facilities quality and
student outcomes including academic achievement and dropout rates.
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In addition to their findings regarding student achievement and housing prices in
New Haven, Connecticut, Nielson and Zimmerman analyzed the effect of school
construction projects on student enrollment. They concluded that enrollment in a
neighborhood school increased by 4.4% for a per-capita investment of $10,000 in school
capital projects. Similar to many findings pertaining to student achievement, the authors
identified enrollment estimates after six years of occupancy in a newly constructed or
substantially improved school facility.

Summary
There is a wide body of literature which identifies a range of positive outcomes
associated with school facilities improvement. First, the majority of relevant studies
found improvements in student achievement, though many estimates only emerged five
or more years after the investment was made. Second, local housing prices were found to
increase after investments in public school facilities. Third, poor school facilities
conditions often are cited as a key element in teacher mobility decisions, alongside other
oft-cited elements of teacher working conditions. Finally, additional evidence, much of it
lacking strong causal identification, links school facilities quality to student outcomes,
including health and attendance, and school outcomes, including school climate and
enrollment. The entire body of evidence lends strong support to the allocation of
expenditures that improve public school facilities.
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Debt Processes and Constraints
School infrastructure investments including new school construction and
substantial renovation projects typically are financed through the issuance of a bond, a
debt instrument that facilitates large short-term expenditures repaid over the long term
(Bowers & Lee, 2013). As a result, evidence regarding the prevalence and efficacy of
district bond issuance is an important element of the conversation regarding school
facilities improvement. Investments in school facilities now total tens of billions of
dollars each year while recent empirical evidence supports the efficacy of such
investments to improve a range of important public policy outcomes including student
achievement. It is worthwhile, therefore, to scrutinize the procedures, policies, and key
determinants of debt issuance, the method by which such investments typically are
facilitated. School districts weigh a range of factors when they pursue debt issuance and
bond referenda, some of which may influence their decisions regarding the timing,
amount, or even the fundamental decision to issue debt.
Once a district has determined a need for a substantial capital improvement
requiring funds in excess of its annual tax-funded allocations, it will typically engage in a
bond issuance procedure (Harris & Munley, 2002). Financing for public capital projects
custimarily is obtained through the issuance of municipal bonds, debt instruments issued
by non-federal governmental entities including organizations with broad governing
mandates such as states and cities, or organizations with more specific purposes including
school districts and water authorities. Municipal bonds capital to the issuing entity
through investor purchases who are repaid over a set period of time, often a period of ten
years or longer (Bowers, Metzger, & Militello, 2010). To attract these investments,
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municipal entities pays investors interest on the investment, interest which may provide
special tax preferences including exemption from federal, state, and local income taxes
for resident purchasers (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2018).
School districts engage in a series of steps to issue a municipal bond. Harris and
Munley (2002) detail the bond issuance decision-making process which includes
obtaining a credit rating, purchasing bond insurance, and, ultimately, bond issuance.
First, a district determines its total capital need and the period over which it projects an
ability to repay investors, usually through some form of increased local taxation. Second,
the district obtains a credit rating from an external credit rating agency, Moody’s Investor
Services, Standard and Poor’s Financial Services, or Fitch Ratings. Next, a district
decides whether to pursue private bond insurance to enhance the bond’s credit rating.
Finally, the district pursues authorization to issue the bond depending on local finance
laws and regulations. In a majority of states, this process occurs through a public voting
referendum. In other states, the district may issue a bond without direct voter approval,
typically depending on the amount of the bond (Ely, 2014). Each of the aforementioned
steps are influenced heavily by a district’s potential cost of borrowing, determined
through its credit rating; therefore, it is worthwhile to review district credit ratings and
the policies aimed to support district debt issuance.

Credit Ratings
A district’s cost of interest on its debt holdings is determined primarily through its
credit rating; as a result, credit ratings are important considerations in district debt
issuance (Ely, 2012a). Credit ratings provide signals to potential investors of the risk of
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the bond issuer defaulting on a repayment. Higher risk of default typically induces a bond
issuer to increase the yield on the bond by increasing the amount of interest that
accompanies principal repayment. Higher interest payments entice investors considering
a range of potential securities by compensating bond holders for assuming greater risk.
Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s are the primary independent credit rating agencies
hired by districts and other municipal entities to generate credit ratings (Harris & Munley,
2002). These rating agencies consider several municipal characteristics to determine a
bond’s rating including the local economic activity, existing debt obligations, and
municipal management capabilities (Hildreth & Miller, 2002).
Once a district receives a credit rating on a potential bond offering, it then decides
whether to pursue bond insurance. Bond issuers may pursue insurance to reduce the cost
of capital by “leasing” the higher credit worthiness of an insurance issuer. Its prevalence
has varied over the years; it peaked in 2005 when 57% of all municipal bonds included
some form of private insurance, a percentage that has declined sharply in the years
following the Great Recession (Ely, 2012a). Denison (2001) details the role of bond
insurance in the costs municipalities bear to issue bonds. The procurement of bond
insurance reduces a bond issuer’s cost of capital by diminishing the adoption of risk of a
bond purchaser. Although a municipal entity may attempt to improve its credit rating,
many of a rating’s underlying characteristics are difficult to manipulate if not determined
entirely exogenously to any municipal policy. Local characteristics including per-capita
income and the strength of the property and income tax base may be affected somewhat
through economic policies, though many such elements may rely more on regional or
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national factors including federal government policy and overarching regional or
statewide economic trends (Denison, 2001).
Bond referenda empower local voters to determine the fate of most bond
offerings. Bowers, Metzger, and Militello (2010) examined factors associated with local
district bond passage in Michigan from 2000 to 2005. The authors found four central
factors influenced the likelihood of voter approval. Smaller bond amounts, larger district
student enrollments, urban and suburban locales (rather than towns and rural areas), and
first bond requests (as opposed to subsequent requests offered for vote) all were
associated with greater likelihood of district bond passage. Collectively, these findings, in
tandem with the literature which evaluates the investments bonds may facilitate in public
schools, offer valuable guidance for policymakers and district administrators as they seek
to allocate scarce resources in schools. On the other hand, further empirical evidence is
needed concerning factors which may constrain school district debt issuance and the
extent to which such constraints may affect district resource provision and student
achievement across varied district contexts.
Several factors may constrain district decisions to issue debt. Districts with
precarious revenue streams, substantial existing liabilities, or uncertain labor contracts,
for example, may be constrained in their abilities to issue debt in a cost-effective manner
due to poorer credit ratings and correspondingly higher potential interest costs. To
support school district investments in public school facilities, many states utilize
programs to either directly support construction projects with state funds or to support
district debt issuance (Verstegen & Jordan, 2009). In fact, in the 2006-2007 school year,
only 11 states did not use any type of state program to support school district construction
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projects in any way. Roughly half the remaining states applied some type of program to
ease potential district credit constraints including debt service grants and guarantees of
district bonds. District access to these state-level programs may influence their respective
credit-related constraints.
A majority of states employ some type of program to directly facilitate district
investments in local school facilities construction. These programs include direct support
in state formula allocations, support for districts of rapidly increasing enrollment, needbased and/or equalization programs determined through local wealth capacities, low-cost
borrowing programs, matching grants, and debt service offset programs (Ely, 2014).
These programs vary significantly by state but are generally growing in size and scope
across the nation.
In addition, some states use credit enhancement programs to augment district
credit ratings, a low-cost alternative to private bond insurance (Ely, 2012b). Similar to
private bond insurance, credit enhancement programs bestow upon districts or other
municipal entities additional backing from a stronger party, a district’s state government
in this instance. The financial advisory firm Fidelity Investments, among other financial
advisory companies, advises its clients considering municipal bond investments on such
state programs. In its most recent publication (DeMarco & Perlovsky, 2018), Fidelity
reported that 27 states employ some type of district credit enhancement program
including standing funds to guarantee district debt and intercept programs to divert state
funding to district debt service in times of financial need. Credit enhancement programs
likewise have grown in prevalence, particularly in the wake of the Great Recession and
for municipal entities with marginal credit ratings (Ely, 2012b).
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On the other hand, the provision of state aid to support district capital
improvement projects may be particularly susceptible to economic downturns (Denison,
Yan, & Zhao, 2007). The design of such state programs conscious of differences in
district characteristics including property wealth and student poverty may serve to reduce
funding inequalities across districts (Duncombe & Wang, 2009). Little research,
however, has examined such policies in close detail. If districts are constrained in their
abilities to access debt capital markets, they may not be able to support certain
expenditures in a manner they may otherwise pursue. The empirical literature is lacking
in evidence regarding how changes to borrowing capacities may affect school resource
provision and student outcomes. Furthermore, access to debt markets may be constrained
for certain district types. Districts with low property wealth and taxable income, for
example, may fail to provide certain educational resources due to constraints on their debt
issuance. For example, there is some indication that higher-spending districts are better
able to meet local education spending preferences through debt markets than their lesserspending peers after state funding reforms (Zimmer & Jones, 2005). Moreover, lowwealth urban districts may be especially price sensitive in their pursuit of debt-funded
capital improvements projects (Wang, Duncombe, & Yinger, 2010). To date, the
relationship between school district debt cost, access, and issuance remains largely
unaddressed.
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Chapter 2
TRENDS IN DISTRICT DEBT UTILIZATION

Introduction
A substantial element of school district expenditures, school capital investments
including new school construction, renovation projects, and facilities maintenance
typically are financed at least in part through the issuance of a bond, a debt instrument
that facilitates large short-term expenditures (Bowers & Lee, 2013). As a result, evidence
regarding the prevalence and trends of district bond utilization is an important element of
the conversation regarding school facilities investments. In effect, municipal bonds act as
long-term loans to the issuing entity. Investors provide capital to issuers through bond
purchase and are repaid in regular intervals over a medium to long period of time, often
longer than a decade (Bowers, Metzger, & Militello, 2010). To attract such investments,
the municipal entity pays the investor interest on the investment, investments which carry
particular tax advantages for investors (U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission,
2018). While the process of bond issuance may be similar across districts, little research
to date has explored similarities and differences in bond utilization across time and
district characteristics.
A number of descriptive trends in district debt utilization inform this study. The
following chapter reviews elements of district debt including its long-term expansion
both on average and decomposed by several heterogeneous district classifications
including geographic characteristics, student demographic characteristics, and district
credit ratings. While different district types utilize debt in greater amounts than do others,
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each of the following groups utilize debt substantially more than they did two decades
ago. As a result, they likewise spend greater amounts on debt service costs.

In this vein, the following research questions motivate this chapter:
1. How has district debt utilization changed over the past two decades?
2. How has district debt utilization varied by district characteristics including student
demographics, district geography, and district credit worthiness over the past two
decades?
3. How have district costs of debt changed over the past two decades?

Data and Sample
I construct a public school district-level panel dataset for the 1994-1995 through
2014-15 school years. These years represent the first and last years of publicly available
annual national district-level finance data. The panel includes characteristics pertaining to
districts and the demographics of their students obtained from the Common Core of Data
(CCD) through the U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES). A number of variables are drawn from the NCES Local Education
Agency Finance Survey, or the F-33. These variables include detailed revenue (i.e. local,
state, federal), expenditure (i.e. instructional, capital, salaries), and debt (long- and shortterm holdings and issuance) variables. Additional district characteristics include student
enrollment, school counts, and district urbanicity (i.e. urban, suburban, town, or rural).
District demographic characteristics include the percentage of students who receive freeor reduced-priced lunch, the percentage of minority students, the percentage of students
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who receive individualized education plans (IEP), and the percentage of students
identified as English language learners (ELL).
To reduce the considerable noise characteristic of district financial data contained
in the F-33 survey, I restrict the dataset by excluding district-year observations based on a
small set of criteria. Following Evans, Schwab, and Wagner (2017), I exclude districtyear observations with per-pupil expenditure data greater than 150% of the 95th percentile
or less than 50% of the 5th percentile. Next, following Lafortune et al. (2018) and
Brunner and Hyman (2018), I exclude district-year observations with enrollment greater
than double the district’s average over the sample period or more than 15% different than
the district’s enrollment in the year prior. The aforementioned authors and others
conclude that such district-year observations observed in NCES likely were reported
incorrectly.

District Trends: 1995-2015
Since the 1994-1995 school year, districts across the nation spent over $1.25
trillion on capital expenditures.1 To finance these expenditures, district long-term
indebtedness increased substantially from approximately $3,000 per pupil to $8,000 per
pupil, on average, as seen in Figure 1. The sheer magnitude of district debt holdings is
noteworthy unto itself. Approximately $8,000 per pupil in annual long-term debt
holdings equates to approximately $400 billion in total across the nation. It is likewise
important to note that these figures nearly have tripled, on average, over the past twenty
years, growth that has closely tracked the magnitude of increases in average per-pupil
1

Author’s calculations from data obtained through National Center for Education Statistics’ Common Core
of Data.
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revenues. The upward trends in district expenditures and debt holdings appear to have
been interrupted in the aftermath of the Great Recession in the years following the 20082009 school year and have resumed subsequently.

Figure 1. District Long-term Debt Holdings and Revenue
Notes: Author’s calculations from data retrieved from the NCES Local Education Agency Finance Survey.
The year 2015 refers to the 2014-2015 school year. Long-term debt is measured at the end of each school
year. Debt and total revenue figures are reported on a per-pupil basis in inflation adjusted $2017. N=11,470
school districts.

The trend of increased per-pupil district indebtedness is shared across different
district types as measured by a number of district characteristics. Figure 2 examines
trends among districts by the number of disadvantaged students they serve, measured by
quartiles of shares of students who receive free- or reduced-priced lunch. Districts
serving the smallest shares of disadvantaged students, for example, hold substantially
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more debt than their more disadvantaged peer districts, growth that appears to have been
most affected by the Great Recession over the past decade. In addition, each quartile
group has increased its respective debt holdings substantially since 1995; debt holdings in
the most disadvantaged quartile increased threefold while debt holdings in the remaining
quartiles at least doubled over the same time period. Substantial gaps in indebtedness
between districts serving different shares of disadvantaged students, $3,000 to $4,000
between the most and least disadvantaged districts, have persisted over the past two
decades.

Figure 2. District Debt Holdings, by FRPL Quartiles
Notes: Author’s calculations from data retrieved from the NCES Local Education Agency Finance Survey.
The year 2015 refers to the 2014-2015 school year. Long-term debt holdings are measured at the end of
each school year and are reported on a per-pupil basis in inflation adjusted $2017. FRPL quartiles are
measured in the 2009-2010 year and refer to the proportion of students in a district who receive free- or
reduced-priced lunch. Q1 contains the quartile of districts serving the fewest such students. N=11,470
school districts.
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Student and district characteristics vary widely across each quartile, as reported in
Table 1. Districts in the fourth quartile serve more than four and half times as many
disadvantaged students and four times as many minority students as districts in the first
quartile. They are approximately 50% larger measured both by student enrollment and
number of district school buildings and are much more likely to be either urban or rural.
On an annual basis, they spend approximately $2,500 less per pupil, or 15%, than the
most advantaged districts. Importantly, their budgets are not derived predominantly from
local sources. Whereas 62.5% of budgets in the first quartile of districts derive from local
sources, less than 31% of budgets in the fourth quartile of districts are raised locally.
These gaps may influence district disparities in certain types of expenditures, including
debt-funded facilities construction and maintenance which are typically raised and paid
off through local revenues.
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Table 1. District Characteristics, by FRPL Quartiles
All Districts

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

3,768.23
(12,522.50)
7.23
(18.07)
0.445
(0.222)
0.047
(0.100)
0.138
(0.049)
0.196
(0.250)

3,239.84
(5,347.68)
5.57
(7.24)
0.159
(0.088)
0.024
(0.050)
0.130
(0.044)
0.097
(0.133)

2,919.43
(8,754.82)
5.95
(11.17)
0.370
(0.044)
0.027
(0.058)
0.141
(0.043)
0.107
(0.144)

3,598.65
(11,852.85)
7.25
(16.93)
0.519
(0.043)
0.039
(0.074)
0.143
(0.049)
0.168
(0.197)

4,468.87
(18,805.04)
8.84
(27.65)
73.33
(0.103)
0.106
(0.165)
0.141
(0.060)
0.415
(0.334)

Urban

0.058

0.034

0.043

0.054

0.096

Suburban

0.212

0.446

0.160

0.231

0.134

Town

0.187

0.110

0.204

0.125

0.211

Rural

0.543

0.410

0.593

0.590

0.559

Panel A: District Demographics
Enrollment
School Count
FRPL
ELL
IEP
Minority

Panel B: District Debt, Revenue, and Expenditure Characteristics
Local Revenue
State Revenue
Federal Revenue
Total Revenue
Total
Expenditures
Long-Term Debt
Holdings
Long-Term Debt
Issued
Short-Term Debt
Holdings
Debt Service
Payments
Districts

6,739.36
(5,008.42)
6,422.91
(5,696.79)
1,687.85
(1,303.67)
14,850.12
(5,122.00)
15,008.30
(5,696.79)
7,749.46
(10,373.23)
927.82
(3,008.77)
291.19
(1,681.72)
333.95
(392.32)

10,486.28
(6,105.57)
5,316.25
(2,735.38)
977.99
(706.64)
16,780.52
(5,707.97)
16,875.75
(6,260.57)
10,296.87
(9,853.78)
1,132.75
(3,241.56)
241.13
(926.89)
454.63
(444.76)

6,800.46
(4,215.75)
6,703.65
(3,233.39)
1,402.06
(728.96)
14,906.17
(4,815.03)
14,951.01
(5,445.88)
8,176.49
(8,647.65)
1,069.61
(3,347.92)
377.873
(1,721.68)
347.590
(388.42)

5,580.901
(3,805.21)
6,709.16
(3,181.35)
1,759.35
(817.32)
14,049.41
(4,602.10)
14,259.48
(5,455.43)
7,015.41
(8,440.16)
878.53
(3,191.87)
434.15
(2,730.76)
302.84
(374.58)

4,325.75
(3,215.49)
7,090.44
(3,280.91)
2,650.66
(1,992.12)
14,066.85
(5,008.41)
14,323.36
(5,405.94)
5,860.65
(14,196.75)
636.59
(2,286.00)
171.53
(782.11)
244.77
(351.62)

11,470

2,867

2,868

2,868

2,867
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Notes: District characteristics are for the 2009-10 school year. Mean (standard deviation) of district
characteristics reported; for geographic characteristic (urban, suburban, rural, and town), proportion of
sample is indicated. Minority is the proportion of a district’s students who are Black or Hispanic. Long- and
short-term debt holdings are measured at the end of the 2009-2010 school year. All finance variables
reported on a per-pupil basis and are inflation adjusted ($2017).

Next, as depicted in Figure 3, districts categorized by their geographic
characteristics similarly have maintained different levels of indebtedness over the past
two decades.2 Suburban and urban districts hold more per-pupil debt than their more rural
counterparts, trends that have persisted as overall indebtedness has grown for districts in
all geographic areas. Urban and suburban districts, as illustrated in Table 2, hold $1,500
to $3,000 more long-term debt and spend $100 to $150 more in debt service costs than
town and rural districts. If debt-funded facilities investments may be important to
improve student and district outcomes, gaps in these investments across district types
may present important public investment considerations.

2

Districts are assigned an urbanicity status (urban, suburban, town, or rural) per its 2009-2010
classification provided by the Common Core of Data.
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Figure 3. District Debt Holdings, by Urbanicity
Notes: Author’s calculations from data retrieved from the NCES Local Education Agency Finance Survey.
The year 2015 refers to the 2014-2015 school year. Long-term debt holdings are measured at the end of
each school year and is reported on a per-pupil basis in inflation adjusted $2017. District urbanicity is
determined in the 2009-2010 school year and is reported by CCD. N=11,470 school districts.
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Table 2. District Characteristics, by Urbanicity
All Districts
Panel A: District Demographics

Urban

Suburban

Town

Rural

3,768.23
(12,522.50)

18,736.47
(35,913.77)

6,291.03
(15,451.04)

2,410.78
(2,113.58)

1,219.85
(2,475.06)

School Count

7.23
(18.07)

31.39
(52.76)

9.74
(20.52)

5.74
(4.11)

3.52
(3.80)

FRPL

0.445
(0.222)

0.526
(0.221)

31.48
(23.87)

0.486
(0.191)

0.464
(0.207)

ELL

0.047
(0.100)

0.137
(0.149)

0.060
(0.104)

0.052
(0.104)

0.033
(0.089)

IEP

0.138
(0.049)

0.129
(0.044)

0.142
(0.040)

0.140
(0.045)

0.138
(0.054)

Minority

0.196
(0.250)

0.456
(0.282)

0.252
(0.267)

0.217
(0.261)

0.134
(0.208)

Enrollment

Panel B: District Debt, Revenue, and Expenditure Characteristics
Local Revenue

6,739.36
(5,008.42)

6,145.43
(3,914.57)

9,908.65
(6,217.98)

5,243.88
(3,551.33)

6,265.89
(4,562.41)

State Revenue

6,422.91
(5,696.79)

6,102.54
(3,161.60)

5,637.23
(2,884.62)

6,397.93
(2,549.82)

6,812.56
(3,428.93)

Federal
Revenue

1,687.85
(1,303.67)

1,856.67
(1,087.28)

12,36.92
(964.65)

1,703.23
(963.21)

1,834.02
(1,531.87)

Total Revenue

14,850.12
(5,122.00)

14,104.63
(4,576.00)

16,782.80
(5,718.16)

13,345.04
(3,822.58)

14,912.46
(5,198.65)

Total
Expenditures

15,008.30
(5,696.79)

14,391.69
(4,738.71)

16,868.46
(5,983.66)

13,539.32
(4,453.34)

15,057.55
(5,980.24)

Long-Term
Debt Holdings

7,749.46
(10,373.23)

8,989.65
(7,402.42)

10,352.92
(9,039.33)

7,557.70
(7,550.79)

6,879.14
(12,157.38)

Long-Term
Debt Issued

927.82
(3,008.77)

918.16
(2,129.27)

1,151.27
(3,143.96)

985.55
(2,991.80)

830.79
(3,128.05)

Short-Term
Debt Holdings

291.19
(1,681.72)

229.17
(860.93)

260.94
(1,154.34)

304.88
(1,387.67)

333.28
(2,051.03)

333.95
(392.32)

414.36
(358.42)

445.90
(411.16)

319.26
(333.74)

295.76
(411.32)

11,470

644

2,518

2,154

6,154

Debt Service
Payments
Districts

Notes: District characteristics are for the 2009-10 school year. Mean (standard deviation) of district
characteristics reported. Minority is the proportion of a district’s students who are Black or Hispanic. Long-
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and short-term debt holdings are measured at the end of the 2009-2010 school year. All finance variables
reported on a per-pupil basis and are inflation adjusted ($2017).

Finally, districts of varying credit scores, as measured by Moody’s in 2010, have
likewise maintained different levels of debt utilization over the past two decades. 3 Recall
that district credit ratings are influenced by a range of factors including local economic
activity, existing debt obligations, and municipal management capabilities (Hildreth and
Miller, 2002). Those districts with the highest credit ratings hold more long term debt, up
to $3,000 more than their lesser rated peer districts, as demonstrated in Figure 4. Each
rated district type increased its outstanding long-term debt from the mid-1990s through
the late 2000s. In light of this growth, the highest rated districts now hold between $0.70
and $1.00 of outstanding debt per every dollar of total revenues, as seen in Figure A2.
Lower rated districts hold less debt per dollar of total revenues; districts with bonds rated
A2 or below by Moody’s now hold less than $0.60 in long-term debt per dollar of total
revenues. Finally, districts lacking any outstanding Moody’s bond ratings, hold the least
outstanding debt, less than $6,000 per pupil, though a figure that has increased from less
than $2,000 two decades ago.4

3

Districts are categorized by their highest outstanding bond rating from Moody’s at the end of the 20092010 school year. There are ten Moody’s investment grade credit ratings from most to least creditworthy:
Aaa, Aa1, Aa2, Aa3, A1, A2, A3, Baa1, Baa2, and Baa3.
4
Districts lacking a Moody’s bond rating at the conclusion of the 2009-2010 school year either lacked any
outstanding bond obligations, had outstanding bond obligations rated by another rating agency, or had
unrated outstanding bond obligations. Harris and Munley (2002) cite three reasons a district would issue a
bond without a credit rating. First, the anticipation of a very poor credit rating may offset any perceived
signal to potential bond purchasers. Second, if bonds are to be marketed in a hyper-local manner, local
investors may already hold sufficient knowledge of a municipal entity’s credit worthiness. Third, if a bond
is small enough, the monetary value associated with a good credit rating may not outweigh the small cost of
obtaining one from a credit rating agency.
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Figure 4. District Long-term Debt Holdings, by Moody’s Credit Rating
Notes: Author’s calculations from data retrieved from the NCES Local Education Agency Finance Survey.
The year 2015 refers to the 2014-2015 school year. Capital expenditures are measured on a per-pupil basis
in inflation adjusted $2017. A district’s credit rating reflects its highest available bond rating in April 2010.
N=11,470 school districts.
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Table 3. District Characteristics, by Moody’s Credit Ratings
Panel A: District Demographics
Aaa

Aa1

Aa2

Aa3

A1

≤ A2

No Rating

8,179.99
(22,329.63)

9,852.16
(20,164.65)

6,139.73
(20,903.74)

4,192.66
(12,519.04)

3,634.72
(6,420.45)

3,674.56
(5,794.05)

1,554.82
(3,916.87)

School Count

13.14
(32.05)

16.30
(27.14)

10.51
(29.37)

7.67
(18.13)

7.19
(12.25)

6.88
(8.60)

4.11
(6.47)

FRPL

0.458
(0.222)

0.426
(0.256)

0.341
(0.216)

0.405
(0.204)

0.420
(0.183)

0.451
(0.211)

0.481
(0.222)

ELL

0.085
(0.959)

0.065
(0.081)

0.041
(0.076)

0.057
(0.120)

0.049
(0.102)

0.062
(0.125)

0.040
(0.098)

IEP

0.106
(0.301)

0.128
(0.313)

0.140
(0.485)

0.141
(0.042)

0.138
(0.035)

0.140
(0.045)

0.142
(0.055)

Minority

0.392
(0.302)

0.284
(0.256)

0.170
(0.204)

0.193
(0.257)

0.184
(0.232)

0.223
(0.269)

0.172
(0.242)

Urban

0.121

0.159

0.090

0.070

0.093

0.056

0.024

Suburban

0.210

0.347

0.441

0.269

0.173

0.247

0.122

Town

0.225

0.188

0.158

0.237

0.340

0.257

0.154

Rural

0.444

0.306

0.311

0.424

0.394

0.440

0.700

Enrollment
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Panel B: District Debt, Revenue, and Expenditure Characteristics
Aaa

Aa1

Aa2

Aa3

A1

≤ A2

No Rating

Local Revenue

6,480.91
(5,529.716)

6,907.50
(6,232.66)

8,272.39
(6,238.20)

7,093.457
(4,308.584)

6,531.59
(3,430.52)

6,367.19
(4,371.18)

6,479.85
(4,939.815)

State Revenue

5,388.20
(2,191.45)

6,073.52
(2,578.58)

6,031.09
(2,683.40)

6,502.486
(3,269.035)

7,925.43
(4,173.72)

7,011.03
(3,461.36)

6,496.10
(3,246.93)

Federal Revenue

1,788.14
(1,021.85)

1,548.19
(983.57)

1,272.09
(798.05)

1,396.259
(792.8391)

1,440.94
(817.14)

1,637.46
(1,454.60)

1,942.11
(1,608.81)

Total Revenue

13,657.25
(4,548.65)

14,528.76
(4,816.55)

15,575.57
(5,325.00)

14,992.2
(4,675.357)

15,897.96
(5,452.21)

15,015.68
(4,990.55)

14,918.05
(5,416.94)

Total Expenditures

14,297.06
(5,443.45)

14908.31
(6,165.43)

15,757.83
(5,568.62)

15,067.73
(5,225.05)

16,455.77
(7,025.28)

14,762.26
(5,401.56)

15,051.11
(5,977.57)

Long-Term Debt Holdings

12,312.02
(9,146.79)

11,272.83
(9,454.07)

11,889.83
(9,382.63)

10,867.37
(8,546.496)

9,525.77
(8,106.80)

10,181.37
(9,228.25)

4,362.78
(11,150.89)

Long-Term Debt Issued

1,225.86
(3,106.36)

1,369.17
(3,720.71)

1,027.15
(2,751.90)

1,309.543
(3,302.577)

1,083.94
(2,922.60)

950.02
(3,030.93)

665.95
(2,948.99)

Debt Service Payments

551.87
(420.94)

469.79
(386.98)

509.338
(402.50)

459.4868
(378.0116)

463.99
(429.32)

449.63
(450.02)

187.66
(338.47)

511

447

1,540

2,515

312

639

5,506

Districts

Notes: District characteristics are for the 2009-10 school year. Mean (standard deviation) of district characteristics reported; for geographic characteristic (urban,
suburban, rural, and town), proportion of sample indicated. Minority is the proportion of a district’s students who are Black or Hispanic. All finance variables
reported on a per-pupil basis and are inflation adjusted ($2017).
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In addition to the the magnitudes and upward trends of debt utilization, debt
service payments, payments to satisfy costs of interest, have increased dramatically as
well. As shown in Figure 5, whereas in 1995 districts paid less than $175 per pupil in
interest payments, they now pay over $300 per pupil, on average, in real terms. Across
the nation, these costs of interest now exceeds $17 billion each year. Similar to debt
utilization, average debt service expenditures declined after the Great Recession but may
increase as outstanding debt increased in the 2013-2014 and 2014-2015 school years.
Debt service payments also constitute 2% to 3% of district budgets, a figure which varies
by different district types and may be substantially higher in certain districts.

Figure 5. District Debt Service Expenditures
Notes: Author’s calculations from data retrieved from the NCES Local Education Agency Finance Survey.
The year 2015 refers to the 2014-2015 school year. District debt service expenditures are expenditures paid
on costs of interest of long- and short-term indebtedness and exclude principal repayments. It is reported on
a per-pupil basis in inflation adjusted $2017. N=11,470 school districts.
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For the average school, debt service cost averaged approximately $174,000 in the
2009-2010 school year, a substantial expenditure which may crowd out other important
district spending. There is also evidence that districts now expend a greater amount on
debt service payments per dollar of capital expenditure. As shown in Figure 6, whereas
districts spent $0.20 in debt service per dollar of capital expenditure in 1995, they now
spend $0.25, a figure which reached a peak of $0.30 in the 2012-2013 school year. These
expenditures would be sufficient to pay the average salaries of three teachers and
substantially more than the average salary of a principal, (Snyder, de Brey, & Dillow,
2015). Districts could spend this amount on other combinations of teacher aides, assistant
principals, etc. would likewise be possible if costs associated with debt spending could be
averted. The efficacy of such hypothetical tradeoffs, however, remain unclear.

43

Figure 6. Ratio of District Debt Service Payments to Capital Expenditures
Notes: Author’s calculations from data retrieved from the NCES Local Education Agency Finance Survey.
The year 2015 refers to the 2014-2015 school year. District debt service expenditures are expenditures paid
on costs of interest of long- and short-term indebtedness and exclude principal repayments. The y-axis
measures the ratio of per-pupil district debt service payments to capital expenditures. N=11,470 school
districts.

Discussion
Over the past two decades, school districts have utilized an increasing amount of
debt. Now averaging $8,000 per pupil on an annual basis, or $400 billion nationally,
long-term debt constitutes an increasingly large component of local school district
revenue-raising. This upward trend is shared by districts characterized by a host of
different student and district characteristics. Districts of varying quantities of
disadvantaged students, of different geographic characteristics, and of a range or credit
worthiness all carry substantially more debt than they did two decades ago. In some
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cases, this amount has tripled in real terms. To finance this increasing amount of debt,
districts have expended an increasing amount on costs of interest, over $300 per pupil on
average.
On the one hand, debt service costs facilitate capital expenditures, potentially
crucial investments in school infrastructure. On the other hand, in the absence of such
costs, districts potentially could make investments in other areas including additional
human capital in the form of additional teachers, aides, or school and district leadership.
Trends in district debt utilization and associated costs, however, do not shed light on the
mechanisms which may influence a school district to alter its debt utilization practices.
Of relevance to local and state bodies of government, questions remain as to whether
there particular policies which may influence school district debt policies. The following
chapter examines a natural experiment related to school district credit scores, a key driver
of district debt service. The experiment avails an opportunity to empirically investigate
potential levers of district debt issuance stemming from sensitivity to its cost. It also
informs analysis of different state policies related to local debt and investigates
differences which may exist across district types, potentially important findings for state
policies governing capital expenditures in schools.
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Chapter 3
DISTRICT CREDIT CONTRAINTS, DEBT ISSUANCE, AND RESOURCE
PROVISION

Introduction
Absent the costs of debt, school districts could issue debt in a manner strictly
governed by local capacities and preferences for principal repayment. In this setting,
districts would not be required to consider the budgetary implications of a line item
dedicated to debt service costs, interest payments directed to bondholders or other
lenders. In reality, districts attract investors to purchase bonds by offering interest on
principal, the magnitude of which are determined primarily through district credit ratings.
Credit ratings, measures of district repayment risk, are informed by a range of underlying
district characteristics discussed previously, factors which may be difficult to manipulate
solely through district policies (Hildreth & Miller, 2002). To better understand the effects
of credit ratings and associated costs of debt on district debt issuance, the following
chapter examines a natural experiment to municipal credit ratings and its effects on
district debt issuance and resource provision.

Moody’s Recalibration
Prior to 2010, Moody’s Investor Service maintained two different bond rating
methodologies. This ‘dual-class’ rating system applied one methodology to U.S.
municipal bond ratings and a second methodology to sovereign bonds, corporate bonds,
and other structured financial products (Moody’s, 2010). In April and May 2010,
Moody’s eliminated its previous municipal bond rating system and applied its ‘Global
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Rating Scale’ to its U.S. municipal bond ratings, including its outstanding ratings on U.S.
school district bonds. As a result of this ‘recalibration’ event, a subset of school district
bond received upgrades of one to three notches on a scale of ten investment-grade
ratings, a purely mechanical shift rather than a reflection of a change in any underlying
district characteristic such as local financial capacities or student demographic
characteristics. Importantly, many districts did not receive a credit rating upgrade on an
outstanding bond. In addition, additional districts did not have outstanding bonds rated by
Moody’s or already had the highest Moody’s credit rating and could not have witnessed
an upgrade.
During and after the Great Recession, credit rating agencies suffered a spate of
criticism in part due to their collective failures to accurately forecast issuer default (i.e.
Pagano and Volpin, 2010).5 Although primarily focused on ratings of structured debt
obligations largely of subprime mortgages, this criticism called into question the ability
of credit ratings to offer substantive information to debt issuers and investors. To
investigate this issue, the House of Representatives Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform held a hearing on October 22, 2008 titled, “Credit Rating Agencies
and the Financial Crisis.” Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and Isralesen (2017) cite the
Congressional testimony of Christopher Shays. Criticizing credit rating agency
performance, Shays commented, “They have no brand, they have no credibility

5

Credit rating agencies also were criticized along additional rationales. Yinger (2009), for example,
compares aspects of credit rating to redlining, suggesting a stricter regulatory framework around the credit
rating process. For purposes of this study, relevant criticisms focus on the role of credit ratings to inform an
issuing entity’s cost of debt.
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whatsoever. I can’t imagine any investor trusting them.” 6 Agency failure to accurately
forecast subprime mortgage default, however, would not necessarily have influenced how
credit ratings could continue to inform subsequent financial activity. Several studies
examine this question (and others) empirically. Indeed, Cornaggia, Cornaggia, and
Isralesen leverage the Moody’s recalibration and find that credit spreads of upgraded
bonds declined relative to non-upgraded bonds. Their findings indicate that upgraded
bonds were seen as less risky to investors, a sign that the bonds credit ratings influenced
investor behavior.
If, on the heels of the Great Recession, credit ratings had lost their capacities to
inform government decision making, changes in credit ratings would not have spurred
action by such parties including subsequent bond issuance. Adelino, Cunha, and Ferreira
(2017) utilize the Moody’s recalibration to determine its effect on a range of county-level
economic characteristics. Using the recalibration event as a treatment variable, they
conclude that local governments which experienced credit upgrades issued more debt,
reduced their costs of borrowing, and increased debt-financed public spending. On its
face, these results may appear counterintuitive. For example, a March 2010 Moody’s
Rating Implementation Guide stated:
Market participants should not view the recalibration of municipal ratings
as rating upgrades, but rather as a recalibration of the ratings to a different
rating scale. This recalibration does not reflect an improvement in credit
quality or a change in our credit opinion for rated municipal debt issuers.
Instead, the recalibration will align municipal ratings with their global
scale equivalent (Moody’s, 2010).

6

House Hearing “Credit Rating Agencies and the Financial Crisis,” transcript available from the U.S.
Government Printing Office at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-110hhrg51103/html/CHRG110hhrg51103.htm
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In other words, the Moody’s statement attempted to make clear that opinion regarding the
credit worthiness of upgraded bonds and their respective issuers should not have changed
due to the recalibration event.
Adelino et al. (2017) provide empirical evidence contradicting the Moody’s
statement in their study of local municipal governments and county governments. First,
they find that upgraded government entities increase their bond issuance. Compared to
local municipal governments that did not experience recalibration, upgraded governments
increased their bond issuance 16% to 20% from April 2010 to March 2013 relative to the
prior four years. To analyze county-level bond issuance, the authors construct a variable
measuring the share of local municipal governments per county that witnessed
recalibration. They find that for a one standard deviation increase in recalibration share,
bond issuance increased 3.1%. Second, they analyzed the effect of recalibration on local
public expenditure and public employment. They find that for a one standard deviation
increase in recalibration share, local government expenditure and employment increased
0.5%. Third, they examined potential spillover effects in the private sector due to
increased public expenditure and employment after recalibration. They find that for a one
standard deviation increase in recalibration share, private employment increased 0.3%
and private income increased 0.5%, both heterogeneously by employment sectors,
including a 1% increase in private employment in the educational services sector.
Following Adelino et al. (2017), I extend this work to study school district debt
issuance and to examine in which district contexts credit upgrades may have been most
important. Examined within a sample of public school districts, the natural experiment
provides a unique setting to analyze a change in the cost of debt issuance rather than
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analyses of changes in underlying district characteristics which typically motivate
changes to credit ratings. In this capacity, the Moody’s recalibration introduces
exogenous variation to district costs of debt. This variation enables the isolation of debt
costs as a variable in district debt issuance and subsequent resource provision.

Logic Model
Figure 7 outlines a logic model spanning from local district revenue generation,
an introduction of an exogenous shock to the cost of debt, district outcomes stemming
from the shock, and variables and contexts which may affect relevant district financial
and academic outcomes.
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Figure 7. Logic Model
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Recall that local revenue, revenue derived from local taxation and debt issuance,
is the only revenue source directly controlled and generated by local municipal entities,
be they school districts or other municipal bodies on behalf of their local school districts.
First, districts may raise revenue through various forms of taxation or through certain
types of user or impact fees, revenues permitted in approximately 12 states (Ely, 2014).
Local property taxes produce the greatest share of local tax revenue while additional local
taxes also are levied on a limited basis on income and various sales categories in
particular jurisdictions (Loeb, 2001). Next, local municipal entities may raise funds
through debt issuance. It is important to note that any debt incurred must be repaid
through other revenue sources, typically through local taxation. Debt issuance, however,
enables districts to reap large infusions of resources in the short term while agreeing to
repay investors with interest, typically achieved through bond issuance, over long periods
of time (Bowers & Lee, 2013). Districts primarily utilize two types of bonds, general
obligation and revenue bonds, bond terms which refer to how a district proposes to secure
the bond. General obligation bonds, the vast majority of school district bond issuance, are
secured through a district’s general revenue capacity, whereas revenue bonds, bonds
utilized less frequently by school districts, are secured through specific revenue sources
(Denison, Yan, & Zhao, 2007).
Next, an exogenous shock to the cost of district debt is introduced. The shock, the
Moody’s 2010 municipal credit rating ‘recalibration,’ serves as a natural experiment to
evaluate district response to an easing of a credit constraints through exogenous credit
rating improvement. A subset of districts’ credit scores improved, enabling comparison to
those districts whose credit ratings did not improve. In typical circumstances, a change in
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a district’s credit rating reflects a change in one or more of a range of district
characteristics including the strength of the local tax base, existing liabilities, local
employment, and demographic factors (Denison, Yan, & Zhao, 2007). A high rating
reflects strong underlying district characteristics pertaining to district repayment capacity
while a low rating reflects a degree of uncertainty in a district’s repayment capacity.
Bond purchasers, therefore, demand higher interest payments to purchase riskier bonds in
compensation for their adoption of risk, interest payments which increase the cost of debt
holdings for school districts. As a result of this natural experiment, many districts
witnessed exogenous credit rating upgrades, thus enabling analyses of a change in the
cost of debt issuance rather than analyses of changes in underlying characteristics which
typically motivate changes to district credit ratings.

I address the following research questions in this chapter:
4. What districts characteristics are associated with debt issuance?
5. Do school districts issue more debt when it becomes cheaper to do so?
a. If so, which school districts are particularly sensitive to changes in their costs
of debt?
6. What are the elasticities of district revenues and expenditures with respects to
additional debt issuance?
7. Does additional debt issuance influence student mathematics and English language
arts achievement?
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Data and Sample
I construct a public school district-level panel dataset for the 2005-2006 through
2014-15 school years, the final year of available national district-level finance data. The
panel includes characteristics pertaining to districts, the demographics and achievement
of their students, and local county economic characteristics from the Common Core of
Data (CCD) through the U.S. Department of Education’s National Center for Education
Statistics (NCES), the U.S. Census, and the U.S. Department of Labor and the Stanford
Education Data Archive (SEDA).
First, I draw a number of variables from the NCES Local Education Agency
Finance Survey, or the F-33. These variables include detailed revenue (i.e. local, state,
federal), expenditure (i.e. instructional, capital, salaries), and debt (long- and short-term
holdings and issuance) variables. Additional district characteristics include student
enrollment, school counts and district urbanicity (i.e. urban, suburban, town, or rural).
District demographic characteristics include the percentage of students who receive freeor reduced-priced lunch, the percent of minority students, the percentage of students who
receive individualized education plans (IEP), and the percentage of students identified as
English language learners (ELL). As in Chapter 2, I restrict the sample to exclude
observations which likely contain erroneous F-33 data.
Next, I draw several variables from federal datasets to account for local economic
characteristics which may be associated with district debt issuance and holding. I include
data pertaining to employment and wages from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Local
Area Unemployment (LAUS) program and Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages
(QCEW). From LAUS, the variables include the total labor force, total employed and
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unemployed, and the unemployment rate. From QCEW I draw total and average wages.
From the U.S. Census Building Permits survey I include the number of building permits
issued and the value of building construction. Each of the economic variables are
measured at the county level; data pertaining to the included economic indicators
typically are not collected on an annual basis at the school district level.
I draw student achievement data from the Stanford Education Data Archive
(SEDA). Available achievement data is limited to the 2008-09 through 2014-15 school
years. Achievement data include math and English language arts which aggregate schoollevel performance in grades three through eight to the district level. The SEDA
achievement data are placed on a common scale, the National Assessment of Education
Progress (NAEP) thus rendering the scores comparable both within and across states and
over time (see Reardon, Kalogrides, & Ho, 2017).
Finally, from Moody’s I obtain a list of recalibrated school district bonds. The
Moody’s recalibration created three types of district designations: 1) Districts with
Moody’s bond ratings which were upgraded in 2010; 2) Districts with Moody’s bond
ratings which were not upgraded in 2010; and 3) Districts without outstanding Moody’s
bond ratings in 2010 which, by default, did not witness credit upgrades. Whereas Adelino
et al. (2017) utilize the recalibration event to generate a continuous variable measuring
the fraction of a county’s local governments which witnessed credit upgrades, the
following analyses focus exclusively on school districts; I assign a treatment indicator to
districts whose bonds were upgraded.
Table 4 summarizes the district demographic characteristics by Moody’s
recalibration status. On average, districts with outstanding Moody’s bond ratings (both
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those with recalibrated credit ratings and those without) are larger, more urban and
suburban, and less rural, than those districts without outstanding credit ratings at the point
of Moody’s recalibration.

Table 4. District Characteristics, by Moody’s Credit Rating Recalibration Status
All Districts

Not Rated

Rated, Not
Recalibrated

Rated,
Recalibrated

3,768.23
(12,522.50)

1,554.53
(3,822.19)

4,695.24
(16,243.23)

6,908.99
(15,770.16)

School Count

7.23
(18.07)

4.11
(6.48)

8.35
(22.77)

11.79
(23.12)

FRPL

0.445
(0.222)

0.481
(0.222)

0.411
(0.212)

0.375
(0.222)

ELL

0.047
(0.100)

0.040
(0.098)

0.059
(0.111)

0.048
(0.091)

IEP

0.138
(0.049)

0.141
(0.055)

0.136
(0.043)

0.137
(0.044)

Minority

0.196
(0.250)

0.172
(0.242)

0.225
(0.268)

0.186
(0.224)

Math Achievement

254.51
(13.84)

253.56
(14.07)

255.56
(12.69)

257.05
(14.50)

English Language
Arts Achievement

235.62
(13.66)

233.99
(14.22)

236.03
(12.63)

239.90
(12.59)

Urban

0.058

0.024

0.072

0.118

Suburban

0.212

0.124

0.272

0.380

Town

0.187

0.154

0.233

0.186

Rural

0.543

0.698

0.423

0.316

Districts

11,470

5,487

4,169

1,814

Enrollment

Notes: District characteristics are for the 2009-10 school year. Mean (standard deviation) of district
characteristics reported; for geographic characteristic (urban, suburban, rural, and town), proportion of
sample indicated. Minority is the proportion of a district’s students who are Black or Hispanic. Math and
English language arts achievement scores represent district average National Assessment of Educational
Progress (NAEP) scores, measured on a scale of 0 to 300.
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Table 5 outlines district debt, revenue, and expenditure characteristics by district
Moody’s recalibration status. While the three types of districts appear similar in terms of
their respective per-pupil revenues and expenditures, their debt usage is quite different.
Districts with an outstanding Moody’s credit rating in 2010 held approximately two and
half times the long-term debt compared to districts without an active credit rating. I
consider those districts with an outstanding Moody’s rating that was not recalibrated to
offer the best comparison to those that were recalibrated for two reasons. First, unrated
districts had no possibility of ‘treatment’ and, thus, were not subject to any exogenous
variation introduced by the natural experiment. Second, unrated districts maintain
different financial practices, issuing and holding substantially less debt than the
remaining districts.
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Table 5. District Debt, Revenue, and Expenditure Characteristics
All Districts

Not Rated

Rated, Not
Recalibrated

Rated,
Recalibrated

Local Revenue

6,739.36
(5,008.42)

6,474.11
(4,938.36)

6,901.90
(4,747.53)

7,974.52
(5,900.47)

State Revenue

6,422.91
(5,696.79)

6,497.65
(3,248.65)

6,478.67
(3,162.99)

6,156.54
(3,016.87)

Federal Revenue

1,687.85
(1,303.67)

1,943.44
(1,611.03)

1,501.73
(914.08)

1,290.62
(965.70)

Total Revenue

14,850.12
(5,122.00)

14,915.20
(5,423.86)

14,882.30
(4,684.56)

15,421.68
(5,493.05)

Total Expenditures

15,008.30
(5,696.79)

15,049.91
(5,985.48)

14,994.46
(5,321.26)

15,700.20
(6,010.14)

7,749.46
(10,373.23)

4,355.33
(11,159.83)

11,085.32
(9,127.45)

11,223.35
(8,594.02)

927.82
(3,008.77)

665.60
(2,951.70)

1,142.47
(3,111.16)

1,273.80
(3,197.39)

291.19
(1,681.72)

163.11
(1,379.66)

423.95
(1,669.53)

468.55
(2,529.04)

333.95
(392.32)

187.53
(338.61)

475.07
(409.25)

489.42
(380.52)

11,470

5,487

4,169

1,814

Long-Term Debt
Holdings
Long-Term Debt
Issued
Short-Term Debt
Holdings
Debt Service
Payments
Districts

Notes: District characteristics are for the 2009-10 school year. Mean (standard deviation) of district
characteristics reported. Long- and short-term debt holdings are measured at the end of the 2009-2010
school year. All finance variables reported on a per-pupil basis and are inflation adjusted ($2017).

Empirical Approach
The aforementioned natural experiment motivates the following empirical
approaches and their respective statistical models in order to analyze the effects of a
reduction in the cost of school district debt issuance. The natural experiment avails a
unique opportunity to examine the role of cost of debt in district revenue provision.
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District Fixed Effects
First, a fixed-effects model using a simple ordinary least squares approach may
estimate the association of various district characteristics with debt issuance and debt
outstanding. Predictor variables include district and student characteristics including
student demographic characteristics including shares of free- and reduced-priced lunch
students, English language learner students, students with an individualized learning plan,
and minority students, district characteristics including urbanicity, school count, and
enrollment, and local county economic characteristics including per-capita wages and
unemployment rates. This model includes district and state-by-year fixed effects. District
fixed effects are included to account for unobserved time-invariant district characteristics
which may affect district finances including district debt issuance. State-by-year fixed
effects are included to account for unobserved characteristics which may exist within a
state and year which may also affect district finances. Such unobserved factors may
include new statewide policies or statewide economic shocks. In addition, many of the
following specifications also control for time-varying economic indicators which may be
associated with local recession intensity due to factors associated with the Great
Recession and other economic shocks.7
1) Yit = β0 + β1(Urbanicityi) + β2(Enrolli) + β3(SchoolCounti) + β4(FRPLi) +
β4ELLi) + β5(IEPi) + Zitω +

i

+ δst + εit

where: Y represents per-pupil district debt holdings for district i in year t; Z represents a
vector of time-variant economic indicators;

i

7

are district fixed effects; δ are state-by-year

Shores and Steinberg (2018) find that 76% of the variance of recession intensity occurred within rather
than across states during the Great Recession.
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fixed effects; Standard errors are clustered at the district level to account for the
interdependence of the error term within districts across time.

Difference-in-Differences
Second, analysis using a difference-in-differences approach may estimate the
average effect of recalibration on debt issuance by comparing those districts exogenously
affected by the Moody’s recalibration event to unaffected districts. Analogous to an
intent-to-treat analysis, this approach estimates district response to a change in the
landscape of their future costs of debt by comparing districts whose potential costs were
exogenously reduced, districts whose credit rating improved, to those whose costs
remained the same, district whose credit rating did not change. The associated statistical
model is as follows:
2) Yit = β0 + β1(Recalibratedi) + β2Postt + β3(Recalibratedi*Postt) + Xitφ+
Zitω +

i

+ δst + εit

where: Y represents per-pupil district debt issuance for district i in year t; Recalibrated is
a time-invariant indicator for whether district i experienced a Moody’s credit rating
recalibration in 2010; Post is a dummy variable indicating the post-Moody’s recalibration
period, such that observations in the pre-reform period (2005-06 through 2009-10 school
years) take on a value of zero, and observations after the Moody’s recalibration event
(2010-11 through 2014-15 school years) take on a value of one; X represents a vector of
time-varying district characteristics pertaining to student attributes (i.e. shares of students
receiving free- or reduced-priced lunch, shares of English language learners, and shares
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of disabled students, etc.) and district attributes (i.e. enrollment, urbanicity, staff-student
ratios, etc.); and the remaining variables are defined as in the first equation.
The central empirical model adds an additional element to the above specification,
a difference-in-difference-in-differences estimation. This triple-difference estimation
analyzes whether (and the extent to which) the effect of treatment was larger for a
particular subset of treated units. There are two such district subsets I hypothesize may be
more sensitive to the Moody’s recalibration event, districts which do not have access to
certain state policies which support capital investments, as outlined by Verstegen &
Jordan (2009) and Ely (2012b, 2014).
First, over the past twenty years, a subset of states did not provide school facilities
expenditure support to their local school districts. 8 As such, districts in these states did
not receive any additional funding from non-local sources associated with improving or
maintaining the physical infrastructures of their schools. Therefore, I hypothesize that
these districts may be more sensitive to their respective costs associated with debt
issuance and may respond to the Moody’s recalibration event to a greater degree than
other recalibrated districts. In other words, I might expect districts which are solely
responsible for local infrastructure spending, investments typically funded through debt
issuance, to be more sensitive to their respective costs of debt than districts only partially
responsible for local infrastructure spending.
The second model subsets those states that have not historically offered any sort
of credit enhancement program to local districts. Recall that state credit enhancement
programs provide a backstop to investors in the case a district defaults on a bond. State
8

These states include Idaho, Indiana, Louisiana, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, Oklahoma,
Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin (Filardo, 2016).
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credit enhancement programs typically guarantee some type of state funding stream to
investors to secure their repayments above and beyond district capacities.
This triple-difference model is as follows:
3) Yit = β0 + β1Recalibratedi + β2Postt + β3(Recalibratedi*Postt) +
β4(Recalibratedi*Postt*NoStatePrograms) + Xitφ+ Zitω +

i

+ δs t + εit

Next, I investigate the potential for heterogeneous response among districts whose
characteristics may be hypothesized to relate to district debt issuance based on the
differences in the prevailing amount of district debt holdings presented in Figures 3 and
4. These regressions examine any differential response to the Moody’s recalibration event
among districts measured by the quartiles of the proportion of free- and reduced-priced
lunch students they serve and by their urbanicity (urban, suburban, town, rural).
Finally, the Great Recession, from December 2007 to June 2009, took place
within the study’s panel timeframe and presents a potential threat to the causal
identification of recalibration on district debt issuance. As a placebo test, I estimate the
effect of the Great Recession on district debt issuance. To do so, I drop observations after
the Moody’s recalibration occurred (2010-11 to 2014-15) and re-estimate equation 5)
using the district types created by the recalibration event during the five year period
leading up to the Great Recession. In this analysis, the school years 2008-09 and 2009-10
are considered the ‘post’ reform years during which the majority of the Great Recession
took place.
Due to the differences in debt utilization between districts rated and not rated by
Moody’s at the time of recalibration in 2010, I create two samples to execute each of the
aforementioned empirical approaches. The ‘full sample’ compares recalibrated districts to
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a sample of districts which were both rated and not recalibrated and which were not rated
in 2010. The ‘restricted sample’ compares recalibrated districts only to districts which
were rated and not recalibrated, districts with very similar debt utilization practices in the
pre-recalibration time period. In consideration of these similarities, I consider the
restricted sample estimates to offer the most salient comparisons. Both sets of
comparisons are included in the following regression results.

Instrumental Variables
To extend the prior analysis, I introduce an instrumental variables approach
utilizing the same Moody’s recalibration event in a two-stage least squares regression.
This analysis examines the effect of additional debt issuance on district resources (perpupil revenues, capital expenditures and instructional expenditures) due to Moody’s
recalibration. Analogous to a treatment-on-the-treated, the models isolate district debt
issuance associated with the natural experiment to test whether it supplements or crowds
out other district revenues by using Moody’s recalibration in the post period as an
instrument for debt issuance. If there is some degree of additional debt issuance
associated with recalibration, the instrument will enable inquiry as to whether the
additional debt issuance may supplement district capital expenditures through a flypaper
effect, the express purpose of bond issuance, or crowd out existing capital expenditures
and supplement instructional revenues. It will also enable analysis of effects on student
achievement.
The IV model is as follows:
5) First stage: Dit = α0 + γRecalibratedi*Postt + Xist Γ + Zjstφ +
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i

+ δt + λt +

it

Second stage: Yit = β0 + β1

isjt +

Xist Γ + Zjstφ +

i

+ δt + λt +

it

where: Dit is the per-pupil amount of debt issued in district i during school year t;
Recalibratedi*Postt represents the exogenous instrument predicting school district debt,
Yit represents per-pupil revenues, capital expenditures, and instructional expenditures,
and district-wide student mathematics and reading achievement in district i during school
year t;

it

represents the predicted amount of debt per pupil from equation 2), and the

remaining variables are defined as in the prior equations. A variation of this model
replaces the instrument Recalibratedi*Postt with Recalibratedi*Postt*NoStateCapExs..
These models include log transformations of debt issuance and dependent financial
variables in order to estimate elasticities with respect to debt issuance.

Results
Table 6 reviews the student demographic and district characteristics associated
with long- and short-term debt issuance and capital expenditure in a district and state by
year fixed effects model. On average, larger school districts, measured both by
enrollment and number of schools, hold less long-term debt on a per-pupil basis. Urban
districts carry less short-term debt. Finally, districts serving larger shares of ELL students
spend more on capital expenditures.

.

64

Table 6. District Debt Holdings and Capital Expenditure
Long-term
Debt

Short-term
Debt

Capital
Expenditures

-225.23***
(40.74)

18.78
(21.91)

-61.51
(16.80)

FRPL

3.73
(4.36)

-0.49
(0.40)

-1.06
(1.39)

IEP

-1.19
(14.75)

-1.30
(1.44)

-0.22
(3.79)

ELL

1.90
(6.54)

-0.11
(0.74)

10.50***
(3.88)

Minority

-0.85
(11.66)

0.47
(1.66)

-5.84
(4.64)

-63.74***
(14.38)

4.27
(4.49)

-15.25
(6.42)

Urban

-45.29
(196.97)

-56.48**
(25.70)

-13.45
(84.62)

Rural

21.06
(139.01)

6.15
(22.21)

-93.74
(60.55)

Town

110.53
(147.42)

-5.96
(24.85)

34.87
(64.94)

Districts

109,223

109,233

109,233

Observations

11,470

11,470

11,470

Enrollment (1000s)

School Count

Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. All regressions include district and state-by-year
fixed effects. Coefficient estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported.
Geographic coefficients are estimated relative to suburban districts. Finance variables are reported on a perpupil basis and are inflation adjusted ($2017). Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5%
(**), and 1% (***) levels

Next, I explore the effect of the Moody’s credit rating recalibration on district
debt issuance. Recall the three districts types created by the Moody’s recalibration event:
1) Districts whose outstanding credit ratings were recalibrated in 2010; 2) Districts whose
outstanding rating credit ratings were not recalibrated in 2010; and 3) Districts which did
not have outstanding Moody’s credit ratings in 2010. Upon visual inspection of Figure 8,
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the three district types exhibited similarly trending per-pupil debt holdings, conforming to
the parallel trends assumption of a difference-in-differences empirical approach. From
2006 to 2010, each of the district types increased its average long-term debt holdings by
approximately $1,000 per pupil.

Figure 8. District Debt Holdings, by Moody’s Credit Rating Status
Notes: Author’s calculations from data retrieved from the NCES Local Education Agency Finance Survey.
The year 2015 refers to the 2014-2015 school year. Long-term debt holdings are measured at the end of
each school year and are reported on a per-pupil basis in inflation adjusted $2017. The vertical line in 2010
represents the year of Moody’s recalibration. N=11,470 school districts.

Table 7 presents regression estimates leveraging the Moody’s recalibration event.
Specifications include district and state-by-year fixed effects with and without controls
for district- and county-level covariates. Columns (1) and (2) present these estimates on
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the full sample, the sample which includes all three district types described previously.
The Post*Recalibrated estimate indicates that districts issued $143 dollars less per pupil
in response to the recalibration event. The Post*Recalibrated*No State CapEx estimate
indicates that districts in states without facilities capital expenditure support issued $265
to $373 more debt than their peer treated districts, on average, in states with such
support.9 Examining the sample restricted to those districts with outstanding Moody’s
credit ratings in 2010 in columns (3) and (4), districts did not issue more debt, on
average, in response to exogenous improvements to their respective credit ratings on
existing debt obligations. These null average treatment effects, however, mask
considerable and important heterogeneity demonstrated by the triple difference. Average
yearly per-pupil debt issuance was $300 higher in districts located in states which
historically have not provided capital expenditure support to their respective districts,
when controlling for district covariates.

9

The results of an alternative triple-difference estimator are presented in Appendix Table A1. This setup
maintains the notion that prevailing state capital expenditure support may influence a district’s sensitivity
to exogenous improvements to its credit rating. Duncombe and Wang (2009) list the following states
which, in 2009, did not provide grants for district capital spending: Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Michigan,
Missouri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, and South Dakota. The triple-difference
estimations using this categorization presented in Appendix A1 are consistent with the results in Table 4.
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Table 7. Effect of Recalibration, by State Capital Expenditure Access
Full Sample
District Debt Issuance (per-pupil)
Post * Recalibrated
Post * Recalibrated *
No State CapEx

Restricted Sample

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-143.17**
(70.81)

-143.40*
(75.67)

17.50
(76.78)

-29.33
(82.60)

265.15*
(158.56)

372.58**
(156.84)

149.15
(180.98)

302.44*
(180.78)

Observations

109,233

57,816

Districts

11,470

5,983

District Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

State * Year Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

District & County Characteristics

X

X

Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Coefficient estimates with robust standard errors
clustered at the district level are reported and are inflation adjusted ($2017). District and county
characteristics include variables reported in table 3. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%
(*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.

The results highlighted in Table 7 are demonstrated visually in Figure 9. Among
recalibrated districts, in the pre-Moody’s recalibration period districts in states without
capital expenditure support held approximately $2,500 less in per-pupil debt than districts
in states which grant such support. This amount shrunk by approximately $1,500 by the
end of the post-Moody’s recalibration period, roughly the sum of $300 in issuance per
year. Districts which receive state support declined in their debt holdings, perhaps as a
reaction to difficult post-recessionary fiscal circumstances. Districts without such support
continued issuing debt and maintained their debt holdings. Adelino et al. (2017)
demonstrate similar findings in broader municipal government settings. Whereas treated
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districts maintained or slightly increase their debt issuance in the three years following
recalibration, untreated districts declined in their debt issuance. 10

Figure 9. District Debt Holdings, by State Capital Expenditure Support (Recalibrated)
Notes: Author’s calculations from data retrieved from the NCES Local Education Agency Finance Survey.
The year 2015 refers to the 2014-2015 school year. Long-term debt holdings are measured at the end of
each school year and are reported on a per-pupil basis in inflation adjusted $2017. The vertical line in 2010
represents the year of Moody’s recalibration. N=5,983 school districts.

Next, I report the second set of results stemming from model (3), the second triple
difference estimation. This model examines the response to recalibration by districts in
states without credit enhancement programs. Districts in the full and restricted samples
10

In the years following the Great Recession, district capital expenditures in states that support such local
investments declined relative to districts in states that lack such programs. Whereas a $500 to $600 perpupil gap in capital expenditures between district types emerged in the early to late 2000s, the gap has all
but disappeared in recent years. See Figure A1 for further details.
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and across states with and without district credit enhancement programs do not appear
sensitive to the recalibration event, on average.

Table 8. Effect of Recalibration, by State Credit Enhancement Access
Full Sample
District Debt Issuance (per-pupil)
Post * Recalibrated
Post * Recalibrated *
No Credit Enhancement

Restricted Sample

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

-134.29
(93.46)
69.41
(126.86)

-82.56
(94.12)
28.11
(132.62)

-17.57
(106.05)
110.71
(140.57)

28.72
(108.09)
6.24
(147.45)

Observations

109,233

57,816

Districts

11,470

5,983

District Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

State * Year Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

District & County Characteristics

X

X

Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Coefficient estimates with robust standard errors
clustered at the district level are reported and are inflation adjusted ($2017). District and county
characteristics include variables reported in table 3. Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10%
(*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
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Tables 9 and 10 investigate the extent to which the estimates provided in Table 7
may vary across district characteristics, specifically among quartiles of districts measured
by students who receive free- or reduced-priced lunch and by district urbanicity,
respectively. Among the third quartile of districts measured by their respective shares of
disadvantaged students in states who do not give capital expenditure support, treated
districts issued considerably more debt, $677 more ($712 in the full sample), than other
rated districts. Districts serving the smallest share of disadvantaged students and
suburban districts may issue more debt in states that do not offer capital expenditure
support than their counterfactual peers, though these estimates are imprecisely estimated
in the restricted sample.
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Table 9. Effect of Recalibration, by District FRPL Quartiles
Full Sample
District Debt Issuance
(per-pupil)

Restricted Sample

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4

Q1

Q2

Q3

Post * Recalibrated

-29.73
(136.50)

-63.34
(144.94)

-128.80
(170.72)

-205.09
(147.62)

75.07
(154.43)

49.49
(152.27)

24.22
(197.18)

Post * Recalibrated *
No State CapEx

696.28*
(372.26)

34.50
(340.64)

711.51**
(309.66)

32.68
(264.95)

504.06
(389.93)

-158.97
(374.55)

677.23*
(390.35)

Observations

27,289

27,326

27,301

27,317

18,747

15,329

12,918

Districts

2,867

2,868

2,868

2,867

1,939

1,605

1,332

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

District Fixed Effects
State * Year
Fixed Effects
District & County
Characteristics

Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Coefficient estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the district level are
inflation adjusted ($2017). FRPL quartiles categorize districts into quartiles measured by the proportion of students in a district who
reduced-priced lunch as measured in the 2009-2010 school year. District and county characteristics include variables reported in ta
indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 10. Effect of Recalibration, by District Urbanicity
Full Sample

Restricted Sample

District Debt Issuance
(per-pupil)

Urban

Suburban

Town

Rural

Urban

Suburban

Town

Rural

Post * Recalibrated

11.61
(173.75)

-230.65*
(112.26)

121.04
(262.00)

-73.60
(159.04)

-5.19
(197.75)

-170.65
(134.61)

333.85
(284.46)

130.02
(174.96)

Post * Recalibrated *
No State CapEx

113.11
(398.20)

645.31*
(349.16)

-43.76
(394.22)

252.52
(296.23)

249.19
(481.60)

432.30
(386.97)

-302.66
(437.72)

325.73
(342.65)

6,128

24,169

20,082

58,854

5,049

17,807

12,566

22,394

644

2,518

2,154

6,154

522

1,842

1,302

2,317

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

X

Observations
Districts
District Fixed Effects
State * Year
Fixed Effects
District & County
Characteristics

Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Coefficient estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported and are
inflation adjusted ($2017). District urbanicity is determined in the 2009-2010 school year and is reported by CCD. Asterisks indicate statistical significance
at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
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Finally, I conduct a placebo test to examine the effect of the Great Recession by
dropping the post-Moody’s recalibration period and re-estimating the difference-indifferences empirical approach with the school years 2008-09 and 2009-10, the heart of
the Great Recession, as the Post years of analysis. Comparing recalibrated districts to
those not recalibrated by Moody’s, both in the full and restricted samples, I do not find
any evidence of differences in debt issuance across district types.

Table 11. Effect of Recalibration, Placebo Test
Full Sample
District Debt Issuance (per-pupil)

Restricted Sample

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Post * Recalibrated

-65.48
(103.23)

-77.32
(120.32)

70.87
(112.59)

70.62
(113.43)

Post * Recalibrated * No State CapEx

-105.88
(233.19)

95.74
(263.56)

-39.97
(273.85)

-37.13
(274.15)

Observations

54,878

28,581

Districts

11,470

5,983

District Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

State * Year Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

District & County Characteristics

X

X

Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Coefficient estimates with robust standard errors
clustered at the district level are reported and are inflation adjusted ($2017). Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
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Table 12 presents the first set of IV results. Panel A uses the interaction term, the
Moody’s recalibration in the post period (the 2010-11 to 2014-15 school years), as an
instrument for district debt issuance. District decisions to issue debt may be driven by a
range of endogenous district characteristics. The instrument isolates district debt issuance
associated with the exogenous variation due to the Moody’s recalibration. In the fullyspecified model presented in column (2), a one percent increase in debt issuance
generates a 0.1% increase in total per-pupil revenues. These additional revenues are spent
not on capital expenditures, however, but on instructional expenditures. Instructional
expenditures have a 0.18% elasticity to an additional one percent increase in debt
issuance, suggesting a crowd out effect of debt issuance on capital expenditure.
Panel B adds the triple-difference interaction term in the prior analysis, a dummy
variable for states that do not provide capital expenditure support to their local districts.
As in the previous analysis, a similar story emerges though in a larger magnitude. A one
percent increase in debt issuance generates a 0.19% increase in per-pupil revenues.
Although the effect size on capital expenditures grows to 0.19, its standard error is large,
suggesting the effect on capital expenditures is unclear. The effect on instructional
expenditures, on the other hand, is precisely estimated at 0.2% for a one percent increase
in debt issuance.
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Table 12. Elasticities with Respect to Debt Issuance
(1)

(2)

Per-Pupil Revenues

0.081*
(0.048)
0.104**
(F = 16.79)

0.096*
(0.075)
0.111**
(F = 11.52)

Capital Expenditures

0.226
(0.414)
0.100*
(F = 16.73)

-0.073
(0.425)
0.108**
(F = 11.52)

Instructional Expenditures

0.165*
(0.087)
0.104**
(F = 16.79)

0.184*
(0.097)
0.111**
(F = 11.52)

Panel A: Moody’s Recalibration

Panel B: Moody’s Recalibration * NoCapEx State
Per-Pupil Revenues

Capital Expenditures

Instructional Expenditures

0.184**
(0.077)
-0.136
(F = 15.53)
0.238
(0.331)
(-0.142)
(F = 15.49)

0.190***
(0.068)
-0.223**
(F = 11.24)
0.194
(0.270)
-0.233**
(F = 11.26)

0.209**
(0.088)
-0.136
(F = 15.53)

0.200***
(0.070)
-0.234*
(F = 11.26)

Observations

109,233

Districts

11,470

Year Fixed Effects

X

X

District Fixed Effects

X

X

State Fixed Effects

X

X

District & County Characteristics

X

Notes: Each column within a panel represents a separate regression. First, coefficient
estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the district level are reported and are
inflation adjusted ($2017). Next, the instrumental variables and F-statistics are reported.
Asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
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Finally, Table 13 reviews the effects of additional debt issuance on student
achievement, replacing the dependent variable of the two-stage least squares regression
with district-level mathematics achievement and English language arts achievement.
There is no clear evidence that the modest positive elasticities of total per-pupil revenues
and instructional revenues with respect to additional debt issuance improved district-wide
student achievement. In column (2) only a weak instrument produces a marginally
statistically significant finding.
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Table 13. Effect of Recalibration on Student Achievement
Math

ELA

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Moody’s Recalibration

13.04
(12.03)
0.081
(F = 21.10)

15.59
(17.86)
0.068
(F = 8.09)

-1.01
(2.40)
0.082
(F = 20.78)

-1.92
(3.34)
0.069
(F = 7.98)

Moody’s Recalibration *
NoCapEx State

7.20
(4.86)
-0.171
(F = 18.66)

4.57*
(2.44)
-0.325
(F = 7.91)

0.70
(1.47)
-0.205
(F = 18.47)

0.77
(1.00)
-0.360**
(F = 7.87)

Observations

50,103

50,103

Districts

10,459

10,459

50,145
10,478

50,145
10,478

District & County Characteristics

X

X

District Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

State Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

Year Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

Notes: Each column within a panel represents a separate regression. First, coefficient estimates with robust standard errors clustered at the
district level are reported and are inflation adjusted ($2017). Next, the instrumental variables and F-statistics are reported. Asterisks indicate
statistical significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
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Discussion
Leveraging the Moody’s credit rating recalibration event prior to the 2010-2011
school year, I find that districts with cheaper access to debt issuance did not issue more
debt in the post period, on average. Certain state-level capital expenditure support
policies, however, may influence district sensitivity to costs of debt. Districts which
experienced recalibration in states which historically have not received capital
expenditure support from their state governments did display sensitivity to improvements
in their credit ratings. Conversely, lack of access to credit enhancement programs does
not appear to influence credit rating sensitivity. These finding suggest that districts who
bear the greatest burden of the share of cost associated with capital improvement, districts
who must finance it entirely themselves, are particularly sensitive to the cost of such
financial outlays. Districts which serve a large share of disadvantaged students, though
not the largest share, also appear to be sensitive to the cost of their capital improvement
projects. It remains unclear if district geographic characteristics may interact with district
sensitivity to cost of debt.
Districts subject to the recalibration exhibited a moderately positive elasticity with
respects to debt issuance. These districts increased their respective per-pupil revenues by
0.1% for every 1% increase in debt issuance, suggesting a slightly positive elasticity of
per-pupil revenues with respect to additional (less expensive) debt issuance. This estimate
is twice as large in states that do not provide capital expenditure support to local districts.
It appears, however, that districts do not spend these additional revenues directly on
capital expenditures. Instead, they maintain their levels of capital expenditure and apply
additional revenues to supplement instructional revenues. This suggests that additional
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debt issuance may crowd out existing capital expenditures. Finally, there was no effect of
Moody’s recalibration detected on district-wide student math or English language arts
achievement. These achievement findings are not unexpected given the modest elasticity
of instructional expenditures to additional debt issuance.
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Chapter 4
DISCUSSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Introduction
This study seeks to expand the body of empirical evidence pertaining to debt
financing in public school districts, a topic which has received scant attention in the
education finance literature. In recent years, much scholarship has explored district
response to state and federal education finance policies which affect district revenues,
particularly for school districts consisting of large disadvantaged student populations. I
address a gap in the literature regarding school district revenue provision through debt
issuance and explore the role of credit constraints on district debt issuance, resource
provision, and student achievement potentially stemming from such credit constraints.
Utilizing a robust district-by-year panel dataset and a unique natural experiment, I seek to
provide novel empirical evidence for policymakers and district administrators as they
consider local and state policies to support the effective distribution of district revenues
across sets of diverse school districts. While districts may weigh competing financial
priorities including contentious labor negotiations, pension obligations, and equitable and
adequate resource distribution, facilities quality remains an ongoing concern. In the
future, an improved understanding of the determinants and outcomes associated with
district debt issuance may help inform a range contemporary debates including the
equitable distribution of school resources, the challenges posed by constrained budget
outlays, and district financial commitments related to pension obligations and labor
contracts.
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Existing Evidence
Amid long-standing growth in public educational expenditures, the empirical
literature has focused on the policy effects of state and federal education finance policies,
many of which have attempted to redress historical inequities in per-pupil funding and
educational disadvantage. These policies have directed a greater share of state funds to
districts serving larger shares of disadvantaged students many of which have been found
to improve student achievement and shrink achievement gaps (i.e. Jackson, Johnson, and
Persico, 2016; Lafortune, Rothstein, and Schanzenbach, 2016). Local school districts,
however, only directly control their locally derived revenues, funds made up of local tax
receipts and borrowed funds. The majority of borrowed funds are obtained through debt
issuance, funds which typically support school district capital expenditures.
A series of recent studies have contributed to an emerging body of evidence
regarding the effects of capital investments in school facilities on a host of important
outcomes including student achievement, attendance, enrollment, and property values,
outcomes relevant to a range of interested parties and research disciplines. Employing a
range of rigorous statistical methods applied to regional natural experiments, several
studies have generated causal estimates related to school facilities investments. The
majority of these studies have found modestly positive effects of facilities construction on
student achievement. Examining New Haven, Connecticut, Nielson and Zimmerman
(2011) find a 0.21 standard deviation improvement in reading scores six years after
students moved to a new or improved school building. Hong and Zimmer (2016) studied
bond elections in Michigan and found improved reading proficiency rates of
approximately 0.1 to 0.3 standard deviations five to seven years after bond passage.
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Conlin and Thompson (2017) studied school construction program in Ohio finding 0.1
percentage point increase in proficiency rates per $1,000 in per-pupil value of capital
stock improvement four years after facilities completion. Lafortune and Schonholzer
(2018) examined a capital improvement program in Los Angeles and found a 0.1
standard deviation improvement in math and 0.05 standard deviation improvement in
reading four years after facilities investment.
Some studies, on the other hand, have found very small positive effects or null
results of the impact of facilities construction on student achievement. In California,
Cellini, Ferreira, and Rothstein (2010) found less than 0.1 standard deviation
improvements in math and reading among third graders, effects which emerged six years
after bond passage and dissipated in the decade thereafter. In Texas, Martorell, Stange,
and McFarlin (2016) found no achievement improvements within six years of bond
passage, though some evidence of small positive results were detected among
disadvantaged students. In a metanalysis reviewing school capital and construction
spending, Jackson (2018) identifies each of these aforementioned studies, concluding that
with some modestly positive effects detected, some null results, and a lack of negative
findings, the balance of evidence suggests a positive, yet heterogeneous, effect of school
capital investment on student achievement.
Studies also have highlighted the relationships between school facilities
improvement and other important outcomes. These outcomes pertain to students,
including health, attendance, and enrollment, teachers, including their job satisfaction,
and communities, including local housing value. While the majority of these findings
lack the same research designs to support causal identifications to make definitive claims
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about specific programs and policies, there is suggestive evidence that school facilities
quality is important beyond student standardized test scores.
Parallel to studies examining the effects of school facilities improvements, studies
have examined district financing mechanisms used to fund such capital expenditures,
namely district bond passage. For example, in Michigan, Bowers, Metzger, and Militello
(2010) found smaller bonds, bonds proposed in larger districts, bonds in urban and
suburban locales (rather than towns and rural areas), and first bond requests (as opposed
to subsequent requests offered for vote) were more likely to gain local voter approval.

Trends and Empirical Evidence
Over the past two decades, school districts increasingly have utilized debt
financing as a means of local revenue provision, doubling their average per-pupil debt
holdings and significantly increasing their debt service expenditures in the process. Debt
financing typically funds capital expenditures, important investments in districts seeking
to improve their physical school environments particularly in districts serving larger
shares of disadvantaged students where schools are more likely to be overcrowded and of
lesser physical quality. Districts of varying student characteristics and policy contexts,
however, do not utilize debt in the same manner.
This paper examines trends in district debt utilization and district sensitivity to
cost of debt informed by credit ratings. District cost of debt is a central aspect of local
educational revenue provision for a number of reasons. While district debt funds
important investments in school capital improvement, districts pay interest on their debt
holdings, payments which may crowd out other educational expenditures. On the other
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hand, if costs of debt are too high, districts may not pursue debt issuance to the extent
they would were it cheaper. Evidence of district sensitivity to costs of debt, therefore,
may inform policymakers interested in supporting school expenditures including capital
investments.
In Chapter 2 I review a series of trends related to district debt utilization. On a
per-pupil basis, districts hold over two and half times as much long-term debt today than
two decades ago, an upward trend that was interrupted by the Great Recession and
appears to have resumed in the years since. These upward trends are shared by each
quartile of districts measured by their shares of disadvantaged students, though most
significantly, on a percentage basis, by the most disadvantaged districts. Districts of all
geographic characteristics have significantly increased their debt holdings, though
suburban districts may have slowed this trend over the past decade. Finally, districts of all
credit scores also have significantly increased their debt holdings, most over twofold in
twenty years.
In Chapter 3, I leverage a natural experiment, a 2010 Moody’s municipal credit
rating recalibration which improved a subset of school district bond credit ratings across
the country. In normal circumstances, changes to district credit ratings are informed by
changes to district characteristics including local economic activity, existing debts, and
leadership quality (Hildreth & Miller, 2002) factors largely endogenous to prevailing
district traits. The Moody’s recalibration event enables the analysis of analyze exogenous
variation associated with district credit ratings in order to directly estimate the effects of
cheaper debt issuance instead of analysis of the effects of changes in some underlying
district characteristic which may influence district credit scores.
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On average, I find that districts which experienced the natural experiment do not
issue more debt than their unaffected peer districts. Breaking down the effect among
recalibrated districts, however, I find that in states where districts historically have not
received capital expenditure support from their respective state governments, recalibrated
districts issued more debt, over $300 per pupil annually in the five-year period following
recalibration. These effects were most pronounced in districts serving large shares of
disadvantaged students, though not the largest shares, as measured by proportions of
students who receive free- or reduced-priced lunch. There does not appear to be a clear
relationship between district geographic characteristics and sensitivity to the costs of debt
issuance. Districts also display a slightly positive elasticity of per-pupil revenues with
respect to additional debt issuance. These additional revenues, however, appear to have
been allocated to instructional expenditures rather than to capital expenditures. Student
achievement in math and English language arts were not affected by these budgetary
decisions.

Policy Implications
The findings presented in this paper indicate that policies governing state support
of local district capital expenditures affect the degree to which districts may be sensitive
to the cost of their debt issuance. These effects were witnessed most significantly in
districts in states which do not support local capital expenditures, particularly in districts
which serve large shares of disadvantaged students. These findings hold considerable
policy relevance as districts and states grapple with crucial decisions concerning longterm capital improvement, especially in districts in the greatest need of facilities
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improvement to support efforts to improve equitable student growth. State policies
pertaining to school capital investments, including direct financial support of district
expenditures and credit enhancement programs have grown in popularity in recent years
but have not been adopted in each state (Verstegen & Jordan, 2009; Ely, 2012b, Ely,
2014).
The Moody’s credit rating recalibration offers a unique natural experiment to
examine district sensitivity to the costs of debt. While the recalibration event does not
represent an important policy consideration unto itself, it avails an opportunity to
examine district debt practices, specifically the role of cost-driven credit constraints, in a
setting where costs of debt may be disentangled from underlying district characteristics.
It is also important to note the point in history when the recalibration occurred,
specifically in the aftermath of the Great Recession. Over this time period, average
school district per-pupil expenditures declined for the first time in three decades as local
and state governments navigated difficult revenue constraints. The Moody’s recalibration
in the spring of 2010 occurred a year after the conclusion of the Great Recession, though
financial effects continued for several years. In this context, these findings may offer
particular relevance in environments of constrained local and state budgets.
The notable magnitude of school district debt usage suggests it deserves the
attention of policymakers in state and local governments. Outstanding obligations now
average over $29 million per district, nearly $8,000 per pupil or approximately $400
billion nationwide. In an unconstrained environment, districts could issue debt without
the need to weigh decisions to cut other important expenditures due to debt service costs.
In practice, however, districts pay interest on their outstanding debt, interest which has
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grown to constitute over 2% of district per-pupil expenditures, on average, and a larger
portion in certain districts. State policies should consider if these costs disincline districts
to spend on important educational inputs. As national policy debate concerning
infrastructure investments gains increased attention (i.e. McNichol, 2016), additional
evidence regarding the determinants of school district debt issuance may help inform
state governments seeking to support capital investments in their respective districts.
Considering the longstanding literature regarding school facilities quality, it would
appear unlikely that schools will cease in their needs for substantial capital investments in
the near future. Therefore, scrutiny of the processes by which districts finance these costs
should inform policymakers interested in implementing such investments in their local
districts.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Effect of Recalibration, by State Capital Expenditure Access, Alternate
Sample
Full Sample
District Debt Issuance (per-pupil)

Restricted Sample

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Post * Recalibrated

-159.52**
(73.00)

-159.87**
(78.21)

12.02
(78.74)

-35.52
(84.95)

Post * Recalibrated * No State CapEx

292.93**
(146.23)

384.32***
(146.13)

155.46
(168.21)

287.57*
(168.79)

Observations

109,223

57,816

Districts

11,470

5,983

District Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

State * Year Fixed Effects

X

X

X

X

District & County Characteristics

X

X

Notes: Each column represents a separate regression. Coefficient estimates with robust standard errors
clustered at the district level are reported and are inflation adjusted ($2017). Asterisks indicate statistical
significance at the 10% (*), 5% (**), and 1% (***) levels.
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Figure A1. District Capital Expenditures, by Levels of State Support
Notes: Author’s calculations from data retrieved from the NCES Local Education Agency Finance Survey.
The year 2015 refers to the 2014-2015 school year. Capital expenditures are measured on a per-pupil basis
in inflation adjusted $2017. The dashed line represents district averages of capital expenditures in districts
where states provide some measure of capital expenditure support to local districts. The solid line
represents district averages of capital expenditures in states without such capital expenditure support
programs for local districts. The vertical bands represent periods of economic recession from March 2001
to November 2001 and December 2007 to June 2009.
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Figure A2. Ratio of District Long-term Debt to Total Revenues, by Moody’s Credit
Rating
Notes: Author’s calculations from data retrieved from the NCES Local Education Agency Finance Survey.
The year 2015 refers to the 2014-2015 school year. Capital expenditures are measured on a per-pupil basis
in inflation adjusted $2017. A district’s credit rating reflects its highest available bond rating in April 2010.
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